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INTRODUCTION 
In my thesis, I discuss on bank risk aggregation, analyzing theoretical and operational 
approaches to identify, measure and aggregate different types of risks, in order to determine the 
economic capital in a coherent way.  
In Chapter I, I talk about Basel Accords, describing how requirements are changed during the 
time, and about the history of risk management and its application in determining the economic 
capital. 
Chapter II is about risk categories. I define the principal risks financial institutions face, i.e. 
credit, market and operational risk, showing how to measure them and their relative 
distributions. I discuss also on the relevance of credit, market and operational risk with respect 
to the trading book, stating that the interactions between different types of risks are to be taken 
into consideration. 
Once identified and measured, there are different ways to aggregate risks. 
In Chapter III, top-down approaches are described. Within top-down approaches, the 
calculation of economic capital is first computed for individual risk types, and then aggregated 
to obtain the total economic capital of the bank. These approaches always reference an 
institution as a whole, and assume that market and credit risk are separable and then aggregated 
in some way. 
The main methods are simple summation, Var - Covar and copulas. They are shown 
theoretically and then through examples from the literature. 
Chapter IV is about bottom - up approaches, which allow to model and measure simultaneously 
different risk types. First, take into consideration interactions between market and credit risk, 
comparing examples from the literature that use top - down and bottom - up methods. Then, I 
elaborate on interest rate risk in particular, as regard to its interaction with credit risk. 
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CHAPTER I: COMMERCIAL BANK RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
 
I.1: The economic background and Basel Accords 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established by the central bank governors of the 
G-10 Countries in 1974 (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) and meets at the Bank for International 
Settlements in Basel. Its objective is to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and 
improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide. The Basel Committee formulates broad 
supervisory standards and guidelines in order to control how much capital banks need to guard 
against the financial risks. The Committee intends not to be a formal supranational supervisory 
authority and its conclusions do not have legal force.  
In 1988 the Basel Committee on banking Supervision introduced the Basel I Capital Accord, 
which intent was to establish the total amount of bank capital in order to reduce the risk of bank 
insolvency and the costs to depositors of a bank failure. Basel I was introduced after the 
deregulation period after 1980 that led to an increase of the international presence of banks, to 
the decline in capital ratios and to the increase of riskiness in the banking system.  
The Basel I accord focused on the determination of the total amount of bank capital in the G-
10 countries: they should have to hold capital equal to at least 8 percent of group of assets 
measured in different ways, according to their level of risk.  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑊𝐴+𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑅𝑊𝐴
= 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 ′𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ≥ 8%   (1)  
Capital had the goal to protect deposits and it was defined into two tiers: Tier 1, or Core Capital, 
was shareholders’ equity and retained earnings; so it was composed by stock issues and 
disclosed reserves, which means funds to absorb potential future losses. Tier 2, or 
supplementary capital, was additional internal and external resources available to the bank, such 
as perpetual securities, undisclosed reserves, subordinated debt with maturity longer than five 
years, and shares redeemable at the option of the issuer. We have to consider that long term 
debt has a junior status relative to deposits, so it could been used to protect depositors and the 
deposit insurer. In addition, Basel I stated that the bank had also to hold half of its measured 
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capital in Tier 1 form1. Under Basel I, exposures were classified only into five categories: 
sovereign, domestic public-sector entities, banks, mortgage lending and other loans to the 
private sector). 
The intent of Basel I was to give more emphasis to banks’ own internal control and management 
and on the supervisory review process, in order to ensure more safety of the financial system: 
banks could not build business volume without adequate capital backing. However, Basel I had 
some limitations in reality: setting the level of claims at 8 percent, banks had the incentive to 
move assets off the balance – sheet, reducing the quality of bank loan portfolios. Basel I also 
did not consider actual economic risk setting risk weights; there was also an inadequate 
recognition of advanced credit risk mitigation techniques, such as securitization and guarantees. 
Thus, it was necessary a more risk sensitive framework that considers also operational risk, 
eliminates regulatory arbitrage by getting risk weights right and aligns regulation with best 
practices in risk management providing banks with incentives to enhance risk measurement and 
management capabilities. Basel I accords did not protect big banks against an hypothetical 
financial crisis because they supposed that the international financial system was much more 
stable than it really was. Banks needed more qualitative capital and it was fundamental to 
eliminate the divergence between Basel I risk weights and the actual economic risk, and the 
regulatory arbitrage by getting risk weights right. 
In June 2004 it was published the Basel II Accord, which introduced the use of credit ratings 
and gave much more importance to the quality of credit, estimating it through risk drivers, such 
as the probability of default (PD) and the loss given default (LGD). The new accord stated that 
it was important to hold capital also for operational risk2. Two methodologies were used to 
compute the Risk Weighted Assets and, thus, the capital requirement for credit risk: the 
Standardized Approach and the Internal Rating Based Approach.  
The first one is based on external risk assessments produced by rating agencies; risk weights 
are set by the committee as a function of the external rating and taking only discrete values. 
Exposures are assigned to 16 different classes based on the nature of counterparty, the technical 
                                                 
1Gallati Reto R., Risk management and capital adequacy, McGraw-Hill, 2003, Ch. 5, pp. 343-344 
2Hull John C., Risk Management and Financial Institutions 
 11 
 
characteristics of the transaction and the manner in which it is carried out. Then, different risk 
weights are assigned to each portfolio, considering the ratings assigned by ECAIs and ECAs to 
each individual country. This system has the pros to be simple and attractive for small banks 
too, to not require extensive modeling, and to be uniform across banks. However, less flexibility 
means less pragmatism. 
The Internal Rating Based Approach is based on banks’ internal credit risk systems and  uses 
risks weights obtained by applying the risk weight function set by the Committee, giving rise 
to a range of values for risk weights.3 To implement the IRB Approach, credits are categorized 
into classes of assets with different underlying risk characteristics (corporate, sovereign, banks, 
retail, equity). Exposures are then distinguished between small and medium size (firms with 
annual sales lower than 50 million Euros), and larger firms. The formers (SMEs) are 
categorized either in the retail class, if the size of the exposure is smaller than 1 million Euros, 
or in the corporate class; the latter are always categorized in the corporate class. 
The approach considers four main risk components: the PD (Probability of Default), the LGD 
(Loss Given Default), which is the expected value of the ratio between the loss due to default; 
the amount of the exposure at the time of default (EAD), which is the value off on-balance-
sheet and off-balance-sheet exposures; and the Maturity (M), which is the average, for a given 
exposure, of the residual contractual maturities of the payments due, each weighted by its 
amount. 
As regard to the risk weight function, there are two different functions: one for sovereign, 
corporate and bank exposures, and another one for retail exposures. 
Sovereign – corporate – bank exposures function: 
𝐾 = {𝐿𝐺𝐷 ∗ 𝑁 [(
1
1−𝑅
)
0,5
𝑁𝐼(𝑃𝐷) + (
𝑅
1−𝑅
)
0,5
𝑁𝐼(0,999)] − 𝐿𝐺𝐷 ∗ 𝐷} {
1+(𝑀−2,5)∗𝑏(𝑃𝐷)
1−1,5𝑏(𝑃𝐷)
} ∗
1,06            (2) 
Where 𝑹 = 0,12
1−𝑒−50𝑃𝐷
1−𝑒−50
+ 0,24 [1 −
1−𝑒−50𝑃𝐷
1−𝑒−50
] − 0,04 [1 −
𝑆−5
45
]   
                                                 
3Antão Paula, Lacerda Ana, Capital requirements under the credit risk-based framework, Journal of 
Banking & Finance, n° 35, 2011, pp. 3. 
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S = function of annual sales of the firm concerned, expressed in millions of Euros 
M = maturity of the exposure, expressed in years 
𝑏(𝑃𝐷) = [0,11852 − 0,05478 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝐷)]2 
N = standard normal distribution 
NI = inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution 
PD = probability of default 
LGD = loss given default 
The sales adjustment (third term on the R definition) applies only to corporate exposures.  
S= annual sales in millions of Euros if annual sales are between 5 and 50 million Euros, equal 
to 5 if annual sales are smaller than or equal to 5 million Euros, and equal to 50 if annual sales 
are higher than or equal to 50 million Euros. 
So, we can say that capital requirements are positively related with PD, LGD, M and R, 
dependently on the loss given default and on the level of sales. In fact, a change in the maturity 
of the credit has an higher impact on capital requirements for higher values of S and LGD. R is 
the correlation coefficient representing the degree of co-movement in credit risk of all 
exposures in the portfolio. The factor 1,06 is an ad-hoc adjustment introduced in 2004 by the 
Basel Committee. 
Retail exposures function: 
𝐾 = {𝐿𝐺𝐷 ∗ 𝑁 [(
1
1−𝑅
)
0,5
𝑁𝐼(𝑃𝐷) + ((
𝑅
1−𝑅
)
0,5
) 𝑁𝐼(0,999)] − 𝐿𝐺𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝐷}  (3) 
Where  
𝑅 = 0,03
1 − 𝑒−35𝑃𝐷
1 − 𝑒−35
+ 0,16 [1 −
1 − 𝑒−35𝑃𝐷
1 − 𝑒−35
] 
This risk function is relevant as exposures lower than one million Euros to SMEs will be 
classified as retail, because capital requirements are not dependent on the maturity of the credit 
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as well as on the level of annual sales. Thus, the correlation R is smaller than the one for 
corporate exposures4. 
Regarding the estimation of risk parameters, the Committee made two approaches available: 
the Foundation Approach, under which banks are required to use their own loss probability 
models but uses prescribed estimates of Loss Given Default; and the Advanced Approach, 
under which banks must use their own estimates of PD, LGD, EAD and M. The two approaches 
are applied to all credit classes with the exception of retail exposures; for this type of exposures, 
the IRB method is applied. 
Finally, we can deduce that costs are higher for implementing the IRB approach, but banks 
could have an advantage because it better reflects the risk of each credit exposure, and it could 
be translated in a competitive advantage for those banks that present better credit risk drivers, 
and, as a consequence, lower capital requirements. 
In the first Pillar of Basel II, the Committee stated the minimum capital requirements also for 
market and operational risk, that will be treated in the second chapter. 
The second Pillar of Basel II regarded the Supervisory review. Banks should have a process for 
assessing their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for 
maintaining their capital levels; then the supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal 
capital adequacy assessments and strategies and ensure their compliance. Supervisors should 
also expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the 
ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum; than they should intervene at 
an early stage to prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels and requiring rapid 
remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored. 
The third Pillar of Basel II regarded the market discipline and introduced rules on the 
information banks are required to publish. It greatly increased the disclosures that the banks 
must make and the transparency in their reporting, allowing marketplace participants to better 
reward well’ managed banks and penalize poorly managed ones. 
                                                 
4Antão Paula, Lacerda Ana, Capital requirements under the credit risk-based framework, Journal of 
Banking & Finance, n° 35, 2011 
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Basel II had some limitations: the total required capital was the sum of the capital for three 
different risks (credit, market and operational), and this implicitly assumed that the risks are 
perfectly correlated, but they are not. In addition, Basel II did not allow a bank to use its own 
credit risk diversification calculations when setting capital requirements for credit risk within 
the banking book. 
I.2: Basel III: structure, proposals and impacts on risk management 
 
After the financial crisis of 2008 – 2009, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
reviewed the existing capital adequacy standards in order to respond to the deficiencies in 
financial regulation revealed by the crisis itself. The intent was to strengthen bank capital 
requirements by increasing bank liquidity and decreasing bank leverage. 
In addition, Basel III introduced requirements on liquid asset holdings and funding stability, 
thereby seeking to mitigate the risk of a run on the bank. 
Basel III had these proposals: to increase the quality and the quantity of capital, to reduce the 
leverage through introduction of a backstop leverage ratio, to increase the long-term balance 
sheet funding, and, finally, to strengthen risk capture, notably counterparty risk.5 
Basel III is structured into three pillars: Pillar I is about capital, risk coverage and containing 
leverage; Pillar II concerns risk management and supervision; and Pillar III contains the market 
discipline. 
In the first Pillar, the Committee wanted to improve loss-absorption capacity in both going 
concern and liquidation scenarios. The Accord states that common equity and retained earnings 
should be the predominant component of Tier 1 capital, instead of debt-like instruments; the 
requirements of Tier 2 are harmonized and simplified with explicit targets and it has been 
provided full deduction of capital components with loss-absorption capacity, such as minority 
interests, holdings in other financial institutions, Deferred Tax Assets; thus, banks were 
encouraged to rise significantly their capital, along with retention of profits and reduced 
dividends. Another implication is that national regulators has less flexibility to allow capital 
instruments to be included in Tier. As regard to the level of capital held, the minimum common 
                                                 
5Basel III: Issues and Implications, kpmg.com  
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equity Tier 1 has been increased from 2.0% to 4.5%, the plus capital conservation buffer is set 
at 2.5%, and the bringing total common equity requirements at 7.0%. As a consequence, banks 
faced a significant additional capital requirement, to be raised as common equity or by retaining 
dividends.  
In Pillar I, the Committee tries also to strengthen risk capture, notably counterparty credit risk 
through more stringent requirements for measuring exposure, capital incentives for banks to 
use central counterparties for derivatives, and higher capital for inter-financial sector exposures. 
It has been modeled the Internal Model Methods (IMM) to stressed periods. The correlation in 
the IRB formula for certain financial institutions has been increase to reflect the experience of 
the recent crisis and the committee set new capital charges for Credit Valuation Adjustments 
and wrong-way risk. The right approach to use, in order to encourage the use of central 
counterparties (CCPs) for standardized derivatives, is “Carrot and sticks”, but the control and 
quality of the CCPs risk management is critical because risk is focused on central bodies. The 
counterparty risk management standards have been improved also in the areas of collateral 
management and stress testing. The cost of dealing with financial counterparties need to be 
priced into the business, leading to a review of the business model. As regard to risk coverage, 
it has been also required banks to conduct more rigorous credit analyses of externally rated 
securitization exposures. As regard to the trading book, it is set a significantly higher capital 
for trading and derivatives activities, as well as complex securitization held in the trading book. 
The new accord introduces a stressed value-at-risk framework to help mitigate pro-cyclicality 
and a capital charge for incremental risk that estimated the default and migration risks of un-
securitized credit products and takes liquidity into account.  
Another objective of Basel III is to reduce the leverage through the introduction of a non-risk 
based leverage ratio that included off-balance sheet exposures and served as a backstop to the 
risk-based capital requirement. The accord set the leverage limit at 3 percent, so the bank’s total 
assets (on- and off-balance-sheet) should not be more than 33 times bank capital. The 
Committee introduces the leverage because it could reduce landing and to incentive banks to 
strengthen their capital position and to focus on higher-risk/higher-return lending. It is also 
increased the short-term liquidity coverage, to strengthen the liquidity framework by 
developing two standards for funding liquidity. The 30-day Liquidity Coverage Ratio is 
intended to promote short-term resilience to potential liquidity disruptions. The LCR has the 
goal to ensure that global banks had sufficient high-quality assets to withstand a stressed 
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funding scenario specified by supervisors. For the LCR the stock of high quality liquid assets 
is compared with expected cash outflows over a 30-day stress scenario and the expected cash 
outflows are to be covered by sufficiently liquid, high-quality assets. Assets have a liquidity-
based weighting varying from 100 percent for governments bonds and cash to weightings of 0 
percents-50 percent for corporate bonds. These changes have the implication to reduce the 
impact from a bank-run and to improve the overall stability of the financial sector. The 
introduction of the LCR has required banks to hold significantly more liquid, low-yielding 
assets to meet the LCR, which will may have a negative impact on profitability. Another 
implication is that banks could change their funding profile, with will lead to more demand for 
longer-term funding. 
Basel III also increases stable long-term funding, designing the Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR), in order to encourage and incentivize banks to use stable sources to fund their activities 
to reduce the dependency on short-term wholesale funding. Banks should increase the 
proportion of wholesale and corporate deposits with maturities greater than one year, but it 
could lead to higher funding costs. Stronger banks with a higher NSFR will be able to influence 
market pricing of assets. Weaker banks will see their competitiveness reduced, which will 
potentially decrease the level of competition.  
Pillar II is about risk management and supervision and has the aim of capturing the risk of off-
balance sheet exposures and securitization activities, of managing risk concentrations, and of 
providing incentives for banks to better manage risk and returns over the long term. 
Pillar III contains the market discipline: the requirements introduced relate to securitization 
exposures and sponsorship of off-balance sheet vehicles. Enhanced disclosures on the detail of 
the components of regulatory capital and their reconciliation to the reported accounts will be 
required, including a comprehensive explanation of how a bank calculates its regulatory capital 
ratios.  
In addition to meeting the Basel III requirements, global systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs) must have higher loss absorbency capacity to reflect the greater risks that 
they pose to the financial system. The Committee has developed a methodology that includes 
both quantitative indicators and qualitative elements to identify global systemically important 
banks (SIBs). The additional loss absorbency requirements are to be met with a progressive 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital requirement ranging from 1% to 2.5%, depending on a 
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bank’s systemic importance. For banks facing the highest SIB surcharge, an additional loss 
absorbency of 1% could be applied as a disincentive to increase materially their global systemic 
importance in the future. A consultative document was published in cooperation with the 
Financial Stability Board, which is coordinating the overall set of measures to reduce the moral 
hazard posed by global SIFIs.  
Jordi Gual in his paper titled “Capital Requirements under Basel III and their impact on the 
banking industry” (2011) discussed on the relationship between capital ratios and risk taking 
and on whether increased capital ratios mean greater costs for the banks. In his paper, Gual first 
broke down the regulatory capital ratio, “E/RWA (in which (E) = equity and (RWA) = risk-
weighted assets), into its two individual components: equity in relation to total assets (E/TA) 
and the (RWA/TA) ratio, which measures the level of risk attached to the institution’s total 
assets. Thus, (E/RWA) = (E/TA)/(RWA/TA).” 6As a consequence, under perfect regulatory 
conditions, an increase in risk uptake, i.e. an increase in (RWA/TA), should be matched by an 
increase in the non-weighted capital ratio (E/TA), or a decrease in leverage (TA/E) and would 
not entail greater risk but it would result in a higher capital. After Basel II, the problem was 
that the risk calculated by banks through the Risk Weighted Asset method did not reflect the 
actual one and there was divergence between the risk actually taken and the risk calculated. 
Gual in his paper demonstrates that a greater proportion of equity in an institution’s financing 
structure does not bring a lower assumption of risk. In his opinion banks attempt to offset the 
increased cost of equity resulting from greater solvency requirements by assuming greater risk 
in order to maintain the return on their equity. Gual states also that increased capital ratios 
meant greater financing costs for banks, in contrast to what the Basel Committee said and to 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem stated. In his opinion, following an increase in capital 
requirements, the cost of financing institutions could rise moderately over the long term, though 
this rise will be more substantial in the short term or during an accelerated transition period. To 
conclude, Gual states that the new regulation set by Basel III could have effects on both the 
cost of financing and the availability of capital, because it does not face the asymmetric 
information problems which exacerbate the valuation of the quality of capital and influence the 
market. In addition, Basel III does not take care of the main problem of bank financing, which 
                                                 
6Gual Jordi, Capital requirements under Basel III and their impact on the banking industry, “la Caixa” 
economic papers, n°07, December 2011  
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is the explicit and implicit underwriting of banking debt, and, in practice, banks’ liabilities do 
not act as buffers for the absorption of losses. 
In January 2013, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the BCBS 239 paper: 
“Principles for effective risk data aggregation and risk reporting”. The impact of this is 
significant for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), as it defines strong requirements 
in terms of data management. The objective of this regulation was to ensure that data used for 
risk calculation and reporting have the appropriate level of quality and that the published risk 
figures can be trusted. This implies that not complying with these principles would jeopardize 
the trust of regulators, which could lead to capital add-ons. At this stage, only G-SIBs are 
concerned, but it is strongly recommended that regulators apply the same rules for local 
systemically important banks, which may lead to wider scope of application. The timeline for 
expected implementation was set the beginning of 2016. This new constraint was also an 
opportunity for banks to improve their operational excellence and increase revenues.7 
  
                                                 
7Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for effective risk data aggregation and risk 
reporting, Bank for International Settlements, January 2013 
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Figure 1: Enterprise data management framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I.3: Risk Management: what it is, history and approaches, banking economic 
capital 
What is “risk”? There are many definitions. The Oxford English Dictionary defines risk as “the 
exposure to the possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a 
chance or situation involving such a possibility”. In finance, we can say that risk is the 
possibility that an actual return on an investment will be lower than the expected return; so, it 
is a condition in which there exists an exposure to adversity. Adversities can be booth internal 
or external. The term “risk” is linked with probability. We cannot measure the degree of risk 
but we can assign a percentage between 0 and 100 to the probability of the adverse outcome8. 
Over the past decades, investors, regulators, and industry self-regulatory bodies have forced 
banks, other financial institutions, and insurance companies to develop organizational 
structures and processes for the management of the different types of risks.  
The function of Risk Management is to identify, evaluate and prioritize risks in order to 
applicate resources to minimize, monitor and control the impact of unfortunate events and to 
                                                 
8Gallati Reto R., Risk management and capital adequacy, McGraw-Hill, 2003, pp. 7 - 8 
Source: BCBS (2013) 
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maximize the realization of opportunities. “Managers need risk measures to direct capital to 
activities with the best risk/reward ratios. They need estimates of the size of potential losses to 
stay within limits imposed by readily available liquidity, by creditors, customers, and 
regulators. They need mechanisms to monitor positions and create incentives for prudent risk-
taking by divisions and individuals.  
Risk management is the process by which managers satisfy these needs by identifying key risks, 
obtaining consistent, understandable, operational risk measures, choosing which risks to 
reduce and which to increase and by what means, and establishing procedures to monitor the 
resulting risk position.”9 
It is fundamental to develop an overall risk management approach able to quantify the overall 
risk exposures of the company. 
Risk management is an evolving concept and has been used since the dawn of human society. 
It has its roots in the corporate insurance industry, where managers were employed at the turn 
of the twentieth century by the first giant companies, the railroads and steel manufacturers. As 
capital investment in other industries grew, insurance contracts became an increasingly 
significant line item in the budgets of firms in those industries, as well. However, risk 
management emerged as an independent approach signaling a dramatic, revolutionary shift in 
philosophy and methodology, occurring when attitudes toward various insurance approaches 
shifted. In the literature, the first risk management concept appeared in 1956 in the Harvard 
Business Review, where Russell Gallagher proposed the revolutionary idea that someone within 
the organization should be responsible for managing the organization’s pure risk: “The aim of 
this article is to outline the most important principles of a workable program for “risk 
management”—so far so it must be conceived, even to the extent of putting it under one 
executive, who in a large company might be a full-time “risk manager.” 
Within the insurance industry, managers had always considered insurance to be the standard 
approach to dealing with risk. Though insurance management included approaches and 
techniques other than insurance (such as non-insurance, retention, and loss prevention and 
                                                 
9Pyle David H., Bank Risk Management: Theory, Research Program in Finance, Working Paper RPF-
272, July 1997 
 21 
 
control). In 1950s there was a revolution in the risk management concept, and it was given more 
emphasis to cost-benefit analysis, expected value, and a scientific approach to decision making 
under uncertainty. The development from insurance management to risk management occurred 
over a period of time and paralleled the evolution of the academic discipline of risk 
management. During World War II, there was the origination of operations research because 
scientists were engaged in solving logistical problems, developing methodologies for deci-
phering unknown codes, and assisting in other aspects of military operations. The development 
happened simultaneously in the industry and in the academic discipline 
New courses such as operations research and management science emphasized the shift in focus 
from a descriptive to a normative decision theory.  
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Figure 2: Enterprise data management framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Markowitz was the first financial theorist to explicitly include risk in the portfolio and 
diversification discussion. He linked terms such as return and utility with the concept of risk, 
combining approaches from operations research and mathematics with his new portfolio 
theory. 10  This approach became the modern portfolio theory, and was followed by other 
developments, such as Fischer Black’s option-pricing theory, which is considered the 
foundation of the derivatives industry. In the early 1970s, Black and Scholes made a 
                                                 
10Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, Journal of Finance 7 (March 1952), pp. 77–91 
Source: Pyle (1997) 
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breakthrough by deriving a differential equation which must be satisfied by the price of any 
derivative instrument dependent on a non-dividend stock. This approach has been developed 
further and is one of the driving factors for the actual financial engineering of structured 
products11.  
The current trend in risk management is a convergence of the differing approaches, and almost 
all leading consulting practices have developed value-at-risk concepts for enterprise-wide risk 
management.  
Figure 3: Development levels of different risk categories 
 
 
Source: Pyle (1997) 
Risk management is basically a scientific approach to the problem of managing the pure risks 
faced by individuals and institutions. The concept of risk management evolved from corporate 
insurance management and has as its focal point the possibility of accidental losses to the assets 
and income of the organization. So we can define risk management, in a broad sense, as “the 
process of protecting one’s person or organization intact in terms of assets and income” and in 
                                                 
11Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, Journal of 
Political Economy 81 (May–June 1973), pp. 637–654.  
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a narrow sense as “the managerial function of business, using a scientific approach to dealing 
with risk”12.  
Modigliani and Miller thought that the firm risk profile could be changed through the use of 
debt financing (1958) or the distribution of dividends (1961)13,and not through the use of 
financial derivative securities. However, in the real world we have to face to transaction costs 
and lack of transparency. Over the past decades, the risk management strategy proposed by 
Modigliani and Miller could not been able to prevent disasters caused by speculation, fraud, or 
money laundering, that left investors with dramatically devalued investments or even in 
bankruptcy because shareholders were unable to take any action to offset or mitigate the risks.  
As a consequence, regulators became more active in considering credit, market and operational 
risks, forcing financial organizations to invest in their infrastructure, processes, and knowledge 
bases. The objective of both management and the regulators is to build and enforce an integrated 
risk management framework. We have to consider that managers and regulators have 
completely different strategies to reach the same objective:  management seeks to protect 
clients’ assets at the lowest possible cost by avoiding losses and by increasing the value of the 
shareholders’ investment through business decisions that optimize the risk premium. 
Regulators seek to protect the clients’ assets without regard to cost, maintaining market stability 
and protecting the financial market by excluding systemic risk.  
Risk management has to serve both purposes and thus has to be structured, built, and managed 
in such a way that it can answer these different needs simultaneously. The models and 
approaches used in the different risk categories must give statements about the risk exposures 
and allow aggregation of risk information across different risk categories: market risk, credit 
risk, operational risk. 
                                                 
12Pyle David H., Bank Risk Management: Theory, Research Program in Finance, Working Paper RPF-
272, July 1997, p. 14 
13 M. H. Miller and F. Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, Journal of 
Business34 (1961), pp. 411–433; The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of 
Investment, American Economic Review48 (1958), pp. 261–29 
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The approach that implement firm-wide concepts aggregating market, credit and operational 
risk is the Total Risk Management, or Integrated Risk Management, which is “the development 
and implementation of an enterprise-wide risk management system that spans markets, 
products, and processes and requires the successful integration of analytics, management, and 
technology".14 
At present, many risk management programs attempt to provide a level of assurance that the 
most significant risks are identified and managed. However, they frequently fall short in 
aggregating and evaluating those risks across the enterprise from a strategic perspective.  
Commercial banks are in the risk business: providing financial services, they assume various 
kind of financial risks. Banking risk management relies on a sequence of steps to implement a 
risk management system. The sine qua non for banks, is to underwrite standards and reports, in 
order to evaluate and rate the exposures, and to understand the risks in the portfolio, trying to 
mitigate them. The standardization of financial reporting is fundamental, too. A second 
technique banks use for internal control is to pose limits and minimum standards for 
participators, to increase their quality. Another technique is to state investment guidelines and 
strategies in order to hedge themselves against systematic risk of a particular type. Banks use 
securitization and derivative activity to reduce their exposures. The management can also enter 
incentive schemes, such as position posting, risk analysis and the allocation of costs.15 
To explain how these techniques of risk management are employed by the commercial banking 
sector, we have first to describe what are the risks banks face: systematic or market risk, credit 
risk, operational risk, and others (like counterparties risk, liquidity risk, legal risk). 
Banks should correctly identify and measure risks, in order to determine the economic capital. 
It is first calculated for individual risk types, most prominently for credit, market and 
operational risk, and then the stand - alone figures are aggregated to obtain the total economic 
capital of the bank. 
                                                 
14Pyle David H., Bank Risk Management: Theory, Research Program in Finance, Working Paper RPF-
272, July 1997, p. 15 
15 Santomero Anthony M., Commercial Bank Risk Management: An Analysis of the Process, Journal of 
Financial Services Research, 1997 
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CHAPTER II: RISK CATEGORIES 
The identification and quantification of risks are fundamental for financial institutions: their 
focus is on calculating the economic capital. In this part of chapter II, I will explain what are 
the main risks that banks have to face and how to correctly measure them, taking into 
consideration their relative distributions. Once quantified and measured, risks should be 
aggregated in order to determine a coherent economic capital, but I will discuss it in the 
following two chapters. 
The main three risks banks should take into consideration are credit, market and operational 
risk. 
II.1: Credit Risk: measures and relative distribution 
Credit risk is the loss that a firm can occur when there are changes in the credit standing of any 
counterparties. The capital required to cover credit risk should be sufficient for losses due to 
unexpected defaults or deterioration of the credit standing of counterparties. Credit risk is 
usually calculated for each counterpart and then aggregated to arrive at the total credit risk for 
the insurer16. 
Credit risk could be defined also as changes in portfolio value due to the failure of 
counterparties to meet their obligations or due to changes in the market’s perception of their 
ability to continue to do so. Traditionally, banks have used a number of methods, such as credit 
scoring, ratings, credit committees, to assess the creditworthiness of counterparties17. 
So, credit risk is the risk of loss due to default on the part of borrowers. Banks are exposed to 
different types of risks due to loans and receivables, to the financial securities such as holding 
                                                 
16Corrigan Joshua, De Decker Jethro, Hoshino Takanori, Van Delft Lotte, Verheugen Henny, 
Aggregation of Risks and Allocation of Capital, Milliman Research Report, September 2009 
17 Pyle David H., Bank Risk Management: Theory, Research Program in Finance, Working Paper 
RPF-272, July 1997 
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bonds, to future obligations assumption, such as the guarantees they give, and to the trading 
activities. 
A “loan” is a financial asset resulting from the delivery of cash or other asset by a lender to a 
borrower in return for an obligation to repay on a specified date or dates, or on demand, usually 
with interest.  
Loans include the following instruments: consumer installments, overdrafts and credit card 
loans, residential mortgages, non-personal loans (such as commercial mortgages, project 
finance loans, and loans to businesses, financial institutions, governments, and their agencies), 
direct financing leases. Loan impairment represents deterioration in the credit quality of one or 
more loans such that it is probable that the bank will be unable to collect, or there is no longer 
reasonable assurance that the bank will be able to collect, all amounts due according to the 
contractual terms of the loan agreements. 
As regard to the methodologies used to compute the Risk Weighted Assets and, thus, the capital 
requirement for credit risk, I have described them in Chapter I: the Standardized Approach and 
the Internal Rating Based Approach.  
In the management of credit risk, it is fundamental the quantification of losses. Losses are made 
by two components: Expected Losses (EL), which are manageable by adequate reserves, and 
Unexpected Losses (UL). 
𝐸𝐿 = 𝐸(𝑇1) × (1 − 𝐸(𝑇𝑟))         (4) 
Where 
EL = expected loss rate 
𝐸(𝑇1) = expected default rate (PD) 
𝐸(𝑇𝑟) = expected recovery rate in case of default (RR) 
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There are two different methodological approaches to assign the credit risk: the Default Mode 
(DM) and the Market to Market (MtM). In the former, the default is the only event that generates 
losses; in the latter, losses are measured also considering the downgrading of the 
creditworthiness of the borrowers. 
In the Default Mode Approach, the process consists in evaluating the probability of default of 
the borrower, the bank’s exposure, and then estimating the amount of the retrievable credit 
portion. 
Thus, the event that generate losses, is default only. The credit loss is calculated as the 
difference between the bank’s credit exposure, which is the amount due to the bank at the 
moment of default, and the present value of future net recoveries. The current and the future 
values of the credit are defined in the default-mode paradigm based on the underlying two-state 
(default versus non-default) notion of the credit loss. The current value is typically calculated 
as the bank’s credit exposure (e.g., book value). The future value of the loan is uncertain, and 
it would depend on whether the borrower defaults during the defined time horizon. In the case 
of non-default, the credit’s future value is calculated as the bank’s credit engagement at the end 
of the time horizon. In the case of a default, the future value of the credit is calculated as the 
credit minus loss rate given default (LGD). The higher the recovery rate following default, the 
lower the LGD. Applying a default-mode credit risk model for each individual credit contract 
(e.g., loan versus commitment versus counter- party risk), the financial institution must define 
or estimate the joint probability distribution between all credit contracts with respect to these 
following three types of random variables: the bank’s associated credit exposure; a binary 
zero/one indicator denoting whether the credit contract defaults during the defined time 
horizon; and, in case of default, the associated LGD. 
Expected Loss = p x LGD x exposure       (5) 
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To calculate the unexpected loss, some assumptions regarding the default probability 
distributions and recoveries have to be made: recovery rates are fixed and are independent of 
the distribution of probabilities. As the borrower either defaults or does not default, the default 
probability can, most simply, be assumed to be binomially distributed with a standard deviation 
of:  
𝜎 = √𝑝(1 − 𝑝)          (6) 
The unexpected loss on the loan, given a fixed recovery rate and exposure amount is: 
Unexpected Loss = √𝑝(1 − 𝑝)x LGD x Exposure      (7) 
Applying the DM approach to the credit portfolio, we have that: 
𝐸𝐿𝑝 = ∑
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝐸𝐿𝑖and𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑝 = ∑
𝑖=1
𝑛 𝑉𝑖×𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑖
𝑛
       (8) 
Where 
𝑉𝑖 = value of the i-th exposure 
n = amount of portfolio’s exposures 
𝑈𝐿𝑝 = √ ∑
𝑖=1
𝑛
∑
𝑗≠1
𝑛
𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑈𝐿𝑗𝑝𝑖𝑗         (9) 
Where  
𝑈𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = unexpected losses on the i-th and j-th exposure 
𝜌𝑖𝑗 = correlation between the default event on the i-th exposure and on the j-th exposure 
The mark-to-market (MTM) paradigm treats all credit contracts under the assumption that a 
credit loss can arise over time, deteriorating the asset’s credit quality before the end of the 
planned time horizon. All credit contracts are instruments of a portfolio being marked to market 
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at the beginning and at the end of the defined time horizon. The credit loss reflects the difference 
of the valuation at the beginning and at the end of the time horizon. This approach considers 
changes in the asset’s creditworthiness, reflecting events that occur before the end of the time 
horizon and must incorporate the probabilities of credit rating migrations through the rating 
transition matrix, reflecting the changes in creditworthiness. The first step is to calculate 
migration paths for each credit position in the portfolio using the rating transition matrix and 
Monte Carlo simulation. This migration is then used to mark the position to market at the end 
of time horizon. We can use two approaches to estimate the current and future values of the 
credit contracts: the discounted contractual cash flow (DCCF) approach and the risk-neutral 
valuation (RNV) approach. 
The discounted contractual cash flow (DCCF) approach is commonly associated with J. P. 
Morgan’s CreditMetrics methodology. The current value of a non-defaulted loan is calculated 
as the present discounted value of its future contractual cash flows. The current value is treated 
as known, because the future value of the credit depends on the uncertain end-of-period rating 
and the market-determined term structure of credit spreads associated with the specific rating. 
The future value of the credit is subject to changes in creditworthiness or in the credit spreads 
according to the market-determined term structure. In the event of default, the future value of a 
credit would be given by its recovery value, calculated as the credit minus loss rate given 
default. 
One limitation of this approach is that it assigns the same discount rates to all contracts with 
the same rating. Thus, for all contracts not defaulted within the defined time horizon, the future 
value does not depend on the expected loss rate given default, as they are not defaulted. Modern 
finance theory holds that the value of an asset depends on the correlation of its return with that 
of the market. So, borrowers in different market segments, exposed to different business cycles 
and other risk factors. 
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To avoid this, Robert Merton developed a structural approach imposing a model of firm value 
and bankruptcy. A company defaults when the value of its underlying assets falls beneath the 
level required to serve its debt. The risk- neutral valuation (RNV) approach discounts 
contingent payments instead of discounting contractual payments. This approach considers a 
credit as a set of derivative contracts on the underlying value of the borrower’s assets. If a 
payment is contractually due at date t, the payment actually received by the lender will be the 
contractual amount only if the firm has not defaulted by date t. The lender receives a portion of 
the credit’s face amount equal to the credit minus loss rate given default (similarly to DM 
Approach). The value of the credit equals the sum of the present values of these derivative 
contracts. The difference from the discount rates used for the discounted contractual cash flow 
approach is that the discount rate applied to the contracts’ contingent cash flows is determined 
using a risk-free term structure of interest rates and the risk-neutral pricing measure. The risk-
neutral pricing measure can be regarded as an adjustment to the probabilities of borrower 
default at each horizon t, which incorporates the market risk premium associated with the 
borrower’s default risk. The magnitude of the adjustment depends on the expected return and 
volatility of the borrower’s asset value. Returns modeled consistently with the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) can be expressed in terms of the market expected return and the firm’s 
correlation beta (β) with the market. This approach combines pricing of the credits with the 
respective credit losses. 
What are the differences between DCCF and RNV approaches? The DCCF assumes a 
nonparametric approach to estimate discount factors. The public debt issuers are grouped into 
rating categories, and the credit spreads on the issuers are then averaged within each rating 
“bucket.” The RNV approach is more complex: each credit is simultaneously modeled in an 
individual framework and the modeling of the market risk premium for each credit is typically 
referenced to credit spreads from the debt market. The two approaches will, in general, assign 
different credit losses to any given loan. 
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There are the following four models, according to the two methodological approaches DM and 
MtM, they can be used to measure credit risk: CreditMetrics, the is a MtM model; CreditRisk+, 
that is a DM model; Credit Portfolio View and KMV, that could be implemented with both the 
approaches. 
Table 1: Comparison of different approaches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In particular, KMV model, that is an unconditional model that links the process of estimating 
the asset values, rates of return, and volatility to current equity prices, which are information-
efficient and incorporate all information available in the market. This approach is comparable 
to the arbitrage price theory (APT) and the multi-factor models. The drawbacks of these models 
are timing and parameterization, that might underestimate losses as the credit cycle enters a 
downturn and overestimate losses as the cycle bottoms out.  
 Gallati Reto R., 2003 
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The KMV looks at the bank’s lending problem from the viewpoint of the borrowing firm’s 
equity holders and considers the loan repayment incentive problem. To solve the two unknown 
variables, E and σE, the system uses the structural relationship between the market value of a 
firm’s equity and the market value of its assets and the relationship between the volatility of a 
firm’s assets and the volatility of a firm’s equity. After values of these variables are derived, an 
expected default frequency (EDF) measure for the borrower can be calculated. A firm borrows 
OB and the end-of-period market value of the firm’s assets is OA2 (where OA2 >OB). The firm 
will then repay the loan, and the equity owners will keep the residual value of the firm’s assets 
(OA2 − OB). The larger the market value of the firm’s assets at the end of the loan period, the 
greater the residual value of the firm’s assets to the equity holders (borrowers). However, if the 
firm’s assets fall below OB (e.g., are equal to OA1), the borrowers of the firm will not be able 
to repay the loan. They will be economically insolvent, will declare bankruptcy, and will turn 
the firm’s assets over to the bank. The pay-off to the equity holder of a leveraged firm has a 
limited downside and a long-tailed upside. The market-value position of equity holders in a 
borrowing firm E as isomorphic to holding a call option on the assets of the firm A.  
Equity can be valued as: 
E = h (A, σA, r, B, T)           (10) 
In equation (10), the observed market value of a borrowing firm’s equity depends on the same 
five variables as per the Black-Scholes-Merton model for valuing a call option. It is necessary 
to solve two unknown variables, A and σA, from one equation where the other variables are 
observable. Thus, we can observe the relationship between the observable volatility of a firm’s 
equity value σE and the unobservable volatility of a firm’s asset value σA. 
𝜎𝐸 = 𝑔(𝜎𝑎)           (11) 
KMV uses an option-pricing Black-Scholes-Merton-type model that allows for dividends. B, 
the default exercise point, is taken as the value of all short-term liabilities, plus half the book 
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value of outstanding long-term debt. While the KMV model uses a framework similar to that 
of Black-Scholes-Merton, the actual model implemented, which KMV calls the Vasicek-
Kealhofer model, makes a number of changes in order to produce usable results. These 
modifications include defining five classes of liabilities, reflecting cash payouts such as 
dividends, handling convertible debt, assuming the default point is an absorbing barrier, and 
relying on an empirical distribution to convert distance to default into a default probability. The 
precise strike price or default boundary has varied under different generations of the model.  
After they have been calculated, the A and σA values can be employed, along with assumptions 
about the values of B and T, to generate a theoretically based EDF score for any given borrower.  
Empirical EDF = Number of borrowers that defaulted within a year with asset values of 2σ 
from B at the beginning of the year/Total population of borrowers with asset values of 2σ from 
B at the beginning of the year. 
The EDFs have a tendency to rise before the credit quality deterioration is reflected in the 
agency ratings. This greater sensitivity of EDF scores, compared to both accounting-based and 
rating-based systems, comes from the direct link between EDF scores and stock market prices. 
As new information about a borrower is generated, its stock price and stock price volatility will 
react, as will its implied asset value A and standard deviation of asset value σA. Changes in A 
and σAgenerate changes in EDFs. Because an EDF score reflects information signals 
transmitted from equity markets, it might be argued that the model is likely to work best in 
highly efficient equity market conditions and might not work well in many emerging markets. 
This argument ignores the fact that many thinly traded stocks are those of relatively closely 
held companies. Thus, major trades by insiders, such as sales of large blocks of shares (and thus 
major movements in a firm’s stock price), may carry powerful signals about the future prospects 
of a borrowing firm.  
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The weakness of this system are the following ones: the construction of theoretical EDFs is 
difficult without the assumption of normality of asset returns; it does not differentiate between 
different types of long-term bonds according to their seniority, collateral, covenants, or 
convertibility; the private firms’ EDFs can be estimated only by using some comparability 
analysis based on accounting data and other observable characteristics of the borrower and thus 
are subject to the same criticisms regarding subjectivity and consistency as are the expert 
systems; the Merton model cannot capture the financial behavior of those firms that seek to 
maintain a constant or target leverage ratio (debt to equity) across time18. 
As regard to Credit risk distribution, the best is Beta Distribution. 
𝐿𝑐 ∼ 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎(𝑝, 𝑞), where 𝐿𝑐 is the credit loss rate. 
The probability density function of 𝐿𝑐 is: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
𝛤(𝑝−𝑞)
𝛤(𝑝)𝛤(𝑞)
𝑥𝑝−1(1 − 𝑥)𝑞−1, 0 < 𝑥 < 1       (12) 
Where p and  q are the two parameters of beta distribution and 𝛤 denotes Gamma function. 
The Beta distribution depends on the parameters p and q. If we know p and q, we can determine 
the credit loss distribution, because we know the mean 𝐸(𝐿𝑐) and the variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿𝑐) of 
credit loss rate. As a consequence, we can derive p and q from the mean and the variance19: 
{
𝑝 =
𝐸(𝐿𝑐)
2
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿𝑐)(1−𝐸(𝐿𝑐))
− 𝐸(𝐿𝑐)
𝑞 =
𝑝
𝐸(𝐿𝑐)
− 𝑝
         (13) 
                                                 
18Gallati Reto R., Risk management and capital adequacy, McGraw-Hill, 2003, pp. 129 - 265 
19Li, J., Zhu, X., Lee, C., Wu, D., Feng, J., Shi, Y., On the aggregation of credit, market and 
operational risks, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Volume 44, Issue 1: 161-189, 
2015 
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II.2: Market risk: measures and relative distribution 
The Bank for International Settlement (BIS) defines market risk as “the risk of losses in on- 
and off-balance-sheet positions arising from movements in market prices”. 
The main factors contributing to market risk are equity, interest rate, foreign exchange, and 
commodity risk. There are also residual risks that can influence the price of financial 
instruments. They are the following ones: spread risk, which is the potential loss due to changes 
in spreads between two or more instruments; basis risk, that is the loss due to the different 
pricing between equivalent instruments; specific risk, which refers to the issuer; and volatility 
risk, that is the loss due to fluctuations in volatilities. The total market risk is the aggregation 
of all risk factors. 
There are three approaches for the quantitative measurement of market risk. 
The first one is the standardized measurement method, under which the capital adequacy 
requirements are preset, depending on the risk factor categories, that are interest-rate and 
equity-price risks in the trading book; and currency, precious metals, and commodity risks in 
the entire organization. 
The capital adequacy requirements are calculated for each individual position and then added 
to the total capital requirement for the institution. The different types of market risks are defined 
as specific risk or general market risk. The former includes the risk that and individual debt or 
equity can move in day-to-day trading and event risk. It is connected to the volatility of 
positions, and it depends on the issuer of specific instruments and not on general market factors. 
Price changes reflect changes in the rating of the acquiring or merging partner. On the contrary, 
the latter is associated to the volatility of positions depending on general market factors. 
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As regard to interest-rate risk, if it is measured only in the trading book, it represents a specific 
kind of market risk. For this type of risk there is a set of maturity bands, within which net 
positions are identified across all on- and off-balance sheet items. A duration weight is then 
assigned to each of the 13 bands, varying from 0.20 percent for positions under 3 months to 
12.50 percent for positions over 20 years. Then, all weighted net positions are summed to obtain 
an overall interest-rate-risk indicator.  
For currency and equity risk, the market risk capital charge is essentially 8 percent of the net 
position; for commodities, the charge is 15 per-cent. All of these capital charges apply to the 
trading books of commercial banks, except for currency risks, which apply to both trading and 
banking books.  
The framework for measurement of market risks and the capital calculation to support market 
risks has to ensure that banks and securities dealers have adequate capital to cover potential 
changes in value (losses) caused by changes in the market price. Not including derivatives, 
which usually exhibit nonlinear price behavior, the potential loss based on the linear 
relationship between the risk factors and the financial instruments corresponds to the product 
of position amount, sensitivity of the position value regarding the relevant risk factors, and 
potential changes in the relevant risk factors. 
The following equation is the basis for the calculation ok market risk and capital requirements 
under the standardized approach: 
𝛥𝜔 = 𝜔 ⋅ 𝑠 ⋅ 𝛥𝑓          (14) 
where: 
𝛥𝜔 = change in value of the position 
𝜔 = value of the position 
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𝑠 = sensitivity 
𝛥𝑓 = change in the price-relevant factor 
Thus, the direction of the change of the relevant risk factors is less important than the change, 
because the method is based on the assumption that the long and short position are influenced 
by the same risk factors, which causes a loss on the net position. The extent of the potential 
changes of the relevant risk factors has been defined by BIS such that the computed potential 
losses, which would have to be supported by capital, cover approximately 99 percent of the 
value changes that have been observable over the last 5 to 10 years with an investment horizon 
of 2 weeks.  
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Table 2:  Capital Adequacy requirements with the Standardized Measurement Method 
Instrument Risk Decomposition 
Interest-rate-sensitive position General market risk: duration or maturity 
method 
 Specific market risk: net position by issuer 
per weight factor, depending on the 
instrument class 
Equity instruments General market risk: 8% of the net position 
per national market 
 Specific market risk: 8% of the net position 
per issuer 
Precious metals 10% of the net position 
Currencies 10% of all net long positions or all net short 
positions, whichever is greater 
Commodities 20% of the net position per commodity group 
plus 3% of the brutto position of all 
commodity group 
 
 
Source: Gallati Reto R. (2003) 
The framework of the standard approach is based on the building- block concept, which 
calculates interest rate and equity risks in the trading book and currency, precious metals, and 
commodity risks in the entire institution separate from capital requirements, which are 
subsequently aggregated by simple addition. The building-block concept is also used within the 
risk categories. As with equity and interest-rate risks, separate requirements for general and 
specific market risk components are calculated and aggregated. That implies that correlations 
between the movements, which are the changes in the respective risk factors, are not included 
in the calculation and aggregation. With movements in the same direction, a correlation of +1 
between the risk factors is assumed, and with movements in opposite directions, a correlation 
of −1 is assumed. The standard approach is thus a strong simplification of reality, as the 
diversification effect based on the correlations between the risk factors is completely neglected, 
 40 
 
which results in a conservative risk calculation and in a higher capital requirement, with respect 
to the internal model approach.  
The second approach is the Internal Model Approach, presented in 1995 by the Basel 
Committee in order to give banks the possibility of using their own risk management models. 
To use this approach, banks have to satisfy qualitative requirements and regular review. 
The regular risk charge on any day t is: 
𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝐾 −
1
60
∑
𝑖=1
60
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡−𝑖, 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡−1)       (15) 
Where k is the multiplication factor determined by the supervisory authority, which can be set 
higher than its minimum of 3 if the supervisor is not satisfied with the bank’s internal risk 
model.  
To obtain total capital adequacy requirements, banks add their credit risk charges to their market 
risk charges applied to trading operations. The local supervisory authority can authorize an 
institution to compute the capital requirements for market risks by means of risk aggregation 
models specific to each institution; they are statistical processes used to determine the potential 
changes in the value of portfolios on the basis of changes in the factors that determine such 
risks. In this connection, value at risk (VaR) is defined as that value which represents the 
maximum potential change in value of the total position, given a certain confidence level during 
a pre-determined period of time. The equity requirements for interest-rate and equity price risks 
in the trading book, and for foreign-exchange and commodity risks throughout an institution, 
result from the aggregation of VaR-based capital charges and any applicable additional 
requirements for specific risks on equity and interest-rate instruments.  
Using the Internal Model, the computation of VaR shall be based on a set of uniform 
quantitative inputs, using a horizon of 10 trading days, or two calendar weeks. It is required a 
99 percent confidence interval, and an observation period based on at least a year of historical 
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data and updated at least once a quarter. Correlations can be recognized in broad categories 
(such as fixed income) as well as across categories (e.g., between fixed income and currencies). 
The capital charge shall be set as the higher of the previous day’s VaR or the average VaR over 
the last 60 business days, times a multiplication factor. The exact value of this factor is to be 
determined by the local regulators, subject to an absolute floor of 3. This factor is intended to 
provide additional protection against environments that are much less stable than historical data 
would lead one to believe.  
A penalty component shall be added to the multiplication factor if back-testing reveals that the 
bank’s internal model incorrectly forecasts risks. The purpose of this factor is to give incentives 
to banks to improve the predictive accuracy of the models and to avoid overly optimistic pro-
jections of profits and losses due to model fitting. As the penalty factor may depend on the 
quality of internal controls at the bank, this system is designed to reward internal monitoring, 
as well as to develop sound risk management systems.  
This method was particularly criticized by the ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association), because the multiplication factor was thought to be too large. The association 
demonstrated tax it was enough to set it equal to 1. Another criticism of the model, is that the 
capital requirement under it is higher than what prescribed by the Committee with the standard 
model. 
There is a third method to assess market risk: the Pre-commitment approach. Under that, the 
bank would pre-commit to a maximum trading loss over a designated horizon. This loss would 
become the capital charge for market risk. The supervisor would then observe a quarterly 
reporting period, whether trading losses exceeded the limit. If so, the bank would be penalized, 
which might include a fine, regulatory discipline, or higher future capital charges. Violations 
of the limits would also bring public scrutiny to the bank, which provides a further feedback 
mechanism for good management. The main advantage of this “incentive-compatible” 
approach is that the bank itself chooses its capital requirement. Regulators can then choose the 
penalty that will induce appropriate behavior. This proposal was welcomed by the ISDA 
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because it recognizes the links between risk management practices and firm-selected 
deployment of capital. Critics, in contrast, pointed out that quarterly verification is very slow 
in comparison to the real-time daily capital requirements of the Basel proposals. Others worried 
that dynamic portfolio adjustments to avoid exceeding the maximum loss could exacerbate 
market movements.20 
As regard to market risk distribution, it is used the normal one to describe market loss rate 𝐿𝑚: 
𝐿𝑚 ∼ 𝛷(𝜇𝑚, 𝜎𝑚)          (16) 
The probability density function of 𝐿𝑚 is: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑚
𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
(𝑥−𝜇𝑚)
2
2𝜎𝑚
2 }        (17) 
Where 𝜇𝑚 and 𝜎𝑚 are the mean and the standard deviation of market loss rate, respectively. 
Thus, market risk loss rate depends on 𝜇𝑚and 𝜎𝑚. If they are known, the market risk loss rate 
distribution can be determined.21 
II.3: Operational risk: measures and relative distribution 
Operational risk is “the risk of loss resulting from failed operational activities. Such failures 
arise from application of the firm’s productive inputs, such as natural resources, labor, and 
capital, to the process of the production of output goods and services.” Thus, it is the “risk of 
                                                 
20Gallati Reto R., Risk management and capital adequacy, McGraw-Hill, 2003; 
21 Li, J., Zhu, X., Lee, C., Wu, D., Feng, J., Shi, Y., On the aggregation of credit, market and 
operational risks, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Volume 44, Issue 1: 161-189, 
2015; 
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loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems, or from 
external events”.22 
According to the BIS, operational risk is connected with breakdowns in internal controls and in 
the corporate governance, which may lead to financial losses through errors, fraud, or failure to 
perform obligations. It is released to the behavior of officers and staff members that could 
conduct business in a risky manner. Operational risks include failure of information technology 
systems o events such as fires or disasters. Thus, operational risk arises both from the influence 
of internal and external events.23 
There are three methods of calculation of operational risk: the basic indicator approach, the 
standardized approach, the advanced measurement approach (AMA). 
The first one, the BIA approach, is designed for less sophisticated and smaller banks, and 
allocates risk capital based on a single indicator of operational risk, which is the gross income. 
Capital charge = 15% x ∑
𝑡=1
3
𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝐺𝐼𝑖)/𝑛       (18) 
Where 𝐺𝐼𝑖 is the annual gross income over the i-th previous year, and n is the number of the 
previous three years for which gross income is positive.24 
                                                 
22 Corrigan Joshua, Luraschi Paola, Operational risk modelling framework, Milliman Research 
Report, February 2013 
23Gallati Reto R., Risk management and capital adequacy, McGraw-Hill, 2003 
24Corrigan Joshua, Luraschi Paola, Operational risk modelling framework, Milliman Research Report, 
February 2013 
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The second approach used is the Standardized one. Using it, banks should map their own 
business units into a standard set of business units defined by the regulator. Then, each of these 
standard units is associated with a financial indicator, which level defines the capital charge.25 
This approach divides the total gross income between eight business lines: 
Capital charge = 15% x ∑
𝑖=1
3
𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝐺𝐼𝑖)/𝑛       (19) 
Where 𝐺𝐼𝑖 is the annual gross income over the i-th previous year and n is the number of the 
previous three years for which gross income is positive. 
The total gross income is divided between eight business lines: 
Capital charge = ∑
𝑗=1
8
𝛽𝑗 × ∑
𝑖=1
3
𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝐺𝑖,𝑗)/3       (20) 
Where is a fixed percentage set for the j-th business line and GIi,j is the annual gross income 
over the i-th previous year for the business line. 
The 𝛽𝑗 coefficients are set to: 
• 18% for the corporate finance, trading, sales, payment, and settlements 
• 15% for the commercial banking and agency services 
• 12% for the retail banking, asset management, and retail brokerage business line. 
At a national supervisor’s discretion, the bank may be allowed to use the alternative 
standardized approach, which basis its calculations for the retail and commercial banking on 
3,5% of total outstanding loans and advances, instead of the gross income. 
                                                 
25Gallati Reto R., Risk management and capital adequacy, McGraw-Hill, 2003 
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The third approach used is called Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA), and it allows the 
exact formula for required capital to be specified by the financial institution itself, if it is 
approved by the supervisors.  It should aim at holding enough capital to cover operational losses 
in one-year-horizon with 99,9% probability. Once adopted, it is expected that risk allocation 
techniques will be constantly developed. Before a bank can use AMA, its model is subject to 
initial monitoring of its appropriateness by the supervisor.26 
As regard to operational risk distribution, it is necessary to notice that losses related to 
operational risk could be either small or very large. So, the distribution is characterized by sharp 
peaks and fat tails. 
Cruz, Coleman and Salkin, in their study “Modeling and measuring operational risk” (1998), 
presented a quantitative operational risk measurement model based on extreme value theory. 
Given a distribution of operational losses for a certain business, they observed the behavior of 
the extreme of the distribution, in order to measure operational risk. They used the Generalized 
Extreme Value Distribution (GEV), to study the behavior of the extremes. This model is very 
similar to VaR methodologies used for market and credit risk.27 
Another reasonable distribution is the log-normal one: 
L0 ~ log normal (µ0, 𝜎0)     
The probability density function is: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎0𝑥
𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
(ln 𝑥−µ0)
2
2𝜎0
2 }        (21) 
                                                 
26 Corrigan Joshua, Luraschi Paola, Operational risk modelling framework, Milliman Research 
Report, February 2013 
27Cruz M., Coleman R., Salkin G., Modeling and measuring operational risk, Imperial College, 
London, 1998 
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Where 𝜇𝑜 and 𝜎𝑜 are two parameters of lognormal distribution, respectively the mean and the 
standard deviation of logarithmic operational loss. The distribution fully depends on 𝜇𝑜 and 𝜎𝑜 
and if they are known, we can determine the operational loss rate distribution. However, 𝜇𝑜 and 
𝜎𝑜 are not provided directly. 
Let 𝑄0(𝜃) be the quantile of operational loss rate at 𝜃(0 < 𝜃 < 1) and 𝑚(𝐿0) denote the mode, 
i.e. the most frequent value of operational loss rate. 
If 𝑄0(𝜃) and 𝑚(𝐿0)are known, 𝜇𝑜 and 𝜎𝑜 can be calculated by solving this function: 
{
exp(𝜇0 − 𝜎0
2)2 = 𝑚(𝐿0)
exp(𝜇0 + 𝜎0𝜙
−1(𝜃)) = 𝑄0(𝜃)
        (22) 
If we know the mean 𝐸(𝐿0) and the variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿0), we can compute 𝜇𝑜 and 𝜎𝑜: 
{
𝜇0 = 𝑙𝑛𝐸(𝐿0) −
1
2
ln (1 +
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿0)
𝐸(𝐿0)2
)
𝜎0
2 = ln (1 +
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿0)
𝐸(𝐿0)2
)
        (23) 
 
II. 4: The fundamental review of trading book: the relevance of credit, market 
and operational risks for banking and trading book with reference to Basel 
reform 
In 2012, the Basel Committee started a revision on the trading book capital requirements, 
because it believed that the definition of the regulatory boundary between the trading book and 
banking book has been a source of weakness. “A key determinant of the boundary has been 
banks’ self-determined intent to trade. Trading intent has proven to be an inherently subjective 
criterion that is difficult to police and insufficiently restrictive from a prudential perspective in 
some jurisdictions. Coupled with large differences in capital requirements against similar types 
of risk on either side of the boundary, the overall capital framework proved susceptible to 
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arbitrage before and during the crisis.” 28 Thus, the Committee gave two different definitions 
for the boundary, a trading evidence-based approach and a valuation-based approach, and it 
provided example instruments which have to be assigned either to the banking book or to the 
trading book. The Committee has also agreed on a range of documentation that banks would 
need to make available to supervisors, as part of new valuation and evidence-based reporting 
requirements for all trading book positions. This would facilitate a better understanding of the 
types of activity that are within the scope of trading book capital requirements. The intent of 
the Committee was to reduce the risk of arbitrage and the differences in capital requirements 
against different types of risk on either side of the boundary. It investigated also the 
development of Pillar 1 charges for interest rate and credit spread risk in the banking book.  
Since the Credit Related products were the main source of losses during the 2009 financial 
crisis, the BIS Committee has agreed to bring the trading book requirements closer to the 
banking book. In addition, the Securitized and non-securitized products are treated differently: 
• As regard to securitization Exposure, instead of allowing banks to use their “Internal Models” 
approach, the committee required banks to use a “Revised Standardized Approach”. This is 
also applicable to “Correlation Trading activities” in the trading books. 
• As regard to Non-Securitization exposures, in order to justify the Non Securitized products 
to match the right capital requirements, taking into account the default risk and spread risk, 
the committee proposed a separate incremental default charge (IDR), that will increase the 
capital requirements for the trading books.   
Additionally, the BIS Committee proposed to keep that the CVA (Credit Valuation 
Adjustments) separate from the Market Risk calculations. 
The Committee proposed to calibrate the capital framework to a stressed market condition time 
frame and to move from VaR to Expected Shortfall method because VaR does not capture the 
                                                 
28 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Fundamental Review on the trading book: a revised 
market risk framework, October 2013 
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tail risk. The new FRTB rules proposed to capture the average of the expected risk in the tail, 
with a 97.5 percentile confidence interval.  
Under Basel 2.5, a “liquidity Horizon” was introduced and it was defined as “the time required 
to execute transactions that extinguish an exposure to a risk factor, without moving the price 
of the hedging instruments, in stressed market conditions”. It formed the input to the 
Incremental Risk Charge (IRC) and the Comprehensive Risk Measure (CRM). Under FRTB 
(so called Basel IV FRTB), Banks’ risk factors were assigned five liquidity horizon categories, 
ranging from 10 days to one year, to ensure consistency in capital outcomes, and in balancing 
the trade-off between simplicity and risk sensitivity. 
The Committee pointed out that trading books benefit in capital reduction by hedging their 
portfolios and by incorporating diversification in their portfolios. However, in times of stress, 
diversification benefits go away and the spread risk increases for the hedging, leading to huge 
loss that have not been incorporated in the capital calculation. To mitigate this risk, FRTB 
regulation proposed the following two main changes: 
• For “Internal Models based approach”, the diversification effects will be recognized with 
some constraints 
• For the “revised Standardized approach”, the recognition of hedging and diversification 
will be significantly increased relative to the current approach. 
From empirical evidence, it became clear that there is a very large difference in capital 
calculation by banks when they use the internal models vs. standardized approaches. The BIS 
tried to bridge this gap and working on proposals that will bring the models based calculation 
closer to the standardized approach calculations by recommending the following three steps: 
• Establish the link between capital calculated by the two approaches 
• Require mandatory calculation of capital using standardized approach by the banks 
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• Making the Standardized Capital as the floor for the capital requirements or introduce a 
surcharge on the models based approach. 
The Basel recommendations of 1996 of calculating the Credit Risk or Market Liquidity Risk 
over a 10-day period proved insufficient during the stressed period of 2009. Keeping this in 
mind, FRTB proposed to break the Model approval process into smaller steps and a set of 
quantitative tools to measure the performance of models. First, a P&L attribution process that 
provides an assessment of how well a desk’s risk management model captures risk factors that 
drive its P&L. Second, an enhanced daily back - testing framework for reconciling forecasted 
losses with actual losses. Where a trading desk fails these tests, the bank would be required to 
calculate capital requirements for that desk using the standardized approach.  
The Revised Standardized approach provides a method for calculating capital requirements for 
banks with business models that do not require a more sophisticated measurement of market 
risk; in addition, it provided a credible fall - back in the event that a bank’s revised market risk 
framework (FRTB) internal market risk model is deemed inadequate, including its potential use 
as a surcharge or floor to an internal models-based capital charge. The approach should 
facilitate transparent, consistent and comparable reporting of market risk across banks and 
jurisdictions. 
The FRBT was finalized in January 2019, and banks are required to report under the new 
standards by 2020. 
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CHAPTER III: TOP - DOWN APPROACHES FOR BANK RISK 
AGGREGATION 
III.1: Top - down aggregation methods: simple summation, Var - Covar and 
copulas 
Within top-down approaches, the calculation of economic capital is first computed for 
individual risk types, and then aggregated to obtain the total economic capital of the bank. These 
approaches always reference an institution as a whole, and assume that market and credit risk 
are separable and then aggregated in some way. 
The first top-down aggregation approach I will discuss on, is the simple summation approach. 
It consists in calculating single risks and then aggregating them by just adding them up. 
The Value At Risk is used to calculate single risks; then, single VaRs are aggregated into total 
VaR. 
The Value at Risk at a specific confidence level 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) is defined as the smallest number l 
such that the probability of loss L exceeding l is not larger than (1 − 𝛼): 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 = 𝑖𝑛𝑓{𝑙: 𝑃(𝐿 ≤ 𝑙) ≤ (1 − 𝛼)}S (24) 
Figure 4: VaR of loss distribution at confidence level 𝛼 
 
 
Source: Li, J., Zhu, X., Lee, C., Wu, D., Feng, J., Shi, Y. (2015) 
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VaR can be calculated from the probability distribution of losses during time T and is equal to 
the loss at the 𝛼-th percentile of the distribution. According to the distributions of credit, 
market, and operational risk described in Chapter II, the single VaRs can be calculated. The 
simple summation approach aggregates the risks by simply adding the individual VaRs of 
different risks: 
Total VaR = VaR (credit) + VaR (market) + VaR (operational)    (25) 
This approach assumes that all the inter-risk correlation coefficients are equal to one and does 
not matters potential diversification benefits. Thus, it assumes that the worst-case scenarios 
always happen simultaneously. 
The simple summation approach risks to be too much conservative because it does not consider 
the imperfect correlations between different types of risks. However, the approach is often 
considered as the benchmark for calculating diversification coefficient because it ignores 
potential diversification benefits and produces an upper bound to the true economic capital 
figure. 
If we want to consider the correlations between different types of risks, the basic method is the 
Var-Covar one. It introduces a correlation matrix to combine the single VaRs and to calculate 
the total VaR: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟 = √(
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)
)
𝑇
(
1 𝜌𝑐𝑚 𝜌𝑐𝑜
𝜌𝑐𝑚 1 𝜌𝑚𝑜
𝜌𝑐𝑜 𝜌𝑚𝑜 1
) (
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)
) (26) 
This approach is very popular because of its simplicity. Within this approach, the diversification 
benefits exist. As regard to the correlation coefficient (R), the smaller it is, the smaller the total 
VaR is. The approach assumes that all risks are jointly normally distributed, and it is a restrictive 
assumption.29 
A more flexible approach is the Copula one. Copulas are functions which combine univariate 
marginal distributions to a multivariate joint distribution. Sklar’s (1959) theorem states that an-
                                                 
29Li, J., Zhu, X., Lee, C., Wu, D., Feng, J., Shi, Y., On the aggregation of credit, market and operational 
risks, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Volume 44, Issue 1: 161-189, 2015 
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dimensional joint distribution function F(x) evaluated at 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛)may be expressed 
in terms of the joint distribution’s copula C and its marginal distributions 𝐹1, 𝐹2, … , 𝐹𝑛 as 
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝐶(𝐹1(𝑥1), 𝐹2(𝑥2), … , 𝐹𝑛(𝑥𝑛)), 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅
𝑛      (27) 
The copula function C is itself a multivariate distribution with uniform marginal distributions 
on the interval 𝑈1 = [0 − 1], 𝐶: 𝑈1
𝑛 → 𝑈1. 
Reformulating the previous formula, we obtain: 
𝐶(𝑢) = 𝐹(𝐹1(𝑢1)1
−1𝐹2(𝑢2)
−1, … , 𝐹𝑛(𝑢𝑛)
−1), 𝑢 ∈ 𝑈1
𝑛     (28) 
Where 𝑢 = (𝑢1, 𝑢2, … , 𝑢𝑛) = (𝐹1(𝑥1), 𝐹2(𝑥2), … , 𝐹𝑛(𝑥𝑛))  are the respective univariate 
marginal distributions. 
Thus, a copula-based approach allows a decomposition of a joint distribution into its marginal 
distributions and its copula. The marginal distributions may be combined into a joint 
distribution assuming a specific copula. The approach allows for a separate modeling of the 
marginal distributions and of the dependence structure (i.e. the copula).30 
VaR is then derived from the joint risk distribution. 
  
                                                 
30 Cech Christian, Copula-based top-down approaches in financial risk aggregation, Working Paper 
Series by the University of Applied Sciences of bfi Vienna, n° 32, December 2006;  
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Figure 5:  Risk aggregation using the copula approach 
Source:  Li, J., Zhu, X., Lee, C., Wu, D., Feng, J., Shi, Y. (2015) 
This approach involves the following five steps: 
• Determining the loss rate distribution of credit, market, and operational risk; 
• Chose a proper copula function; 
• Using Monte Carlo simulation in order to simulate joint credit, market and operational loss 
rates based on copula function and the three individual loss rate distributions; 
• Calculating the total loss rate by adding simulated joint credit, market and operational loss 
rate; 
• Calculating the total VaR according to the total loss rate distribution. 
Let Fc, Fmand Fodenote the cumulative distributions of credit, market and operational loss rate, 
Lc, Lmand Lo, respectively. Let C denotes the copula function and F denotes the joint loss rate 
distribution. Then, the joint loss rate distribution F can be derived by using the copula function 
to link these marginal cumulative distributions together: 
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𝐹(𝐿𝑐, 𝐿𝑚,𝐿𝑜) = 𝐶(𝐹𝑐(𝐿𝑐), 𝐹𝑚(𝐿𝑚), 𝐹𝑜(𝐿𝑜))       (29) 
Analytical expression of multivariate distribution of loss rate does not always exist. In this case, 
Monte Carlo simulation is used to derive the total loss rate distribution. Monte Carlo simulation 
uses conditional sampling to construct multiple correlated variables. Let (uc, um, uo) denotes a 
joint sample of uniform random variables from the multivariate distribution specified by the 
copula. Then a sample of joint loss rate is 
𝐹𝑐
−1(𝑢𝑐), 𝐹𝑚
−1(𝑢𝑚), 𝐹𝑜
−1(𝑢𝑜),          (30) 
where𝐹𝑐
−1(𝑢𝑐) is the simulated credit loss rate, 𝐹𝑚
−1(𝑢𝑚) is the simulated market loss rate and 
𝐹𝑜
−1(𝑢𝑜) is the simulated operational loss rate. 
L is the total loss rate, defined as follows: 
𝐿 = 𝐹𝑐
−1(𝑢𝑐) + 𝐹𝑚
−1(𝑢𝑚) + 𝐹𝑜
−1(𝑢𝑜)       (31) 
Assume the simulation is conducted n times. Then n simulated total loss rates are derived. As 
the number of simulations increases, the total loss rates L1, ..., Lnconverge to the total loss rate 
distribution. When the number of simulations reaches a certain threshold, this empirical 
distribution and the actual distribution are very close, so it is reasonable to derive the total VaR 
from the empirical distribution. Total VaR is equal to the 𝛼-th percentile of the total loss rate 
distribution. Joint distribution of risk loss rates is decomposed into marginal distribution and 
dependence structure by the copula function. Therefore, copula functions can be much more 
flexible in describing dependence structure of different risks. Besides, in contrast to the simple 
summation approach and Var-Covar approach, the copula approach here uses the entire credit, 
market and operational risk distributions as the inputs for the risk aggregation process, rather 
than VaRs of the three risks. Accordingly, the outputs include the total risk distribution rather 
than just a total VaR, which is very valuable.  
There are many Copula functions that can be used. The most used are the elliptical one, such 
as Gaussian copulas and Student-t copulas, and the Gumbel, Clayton and Frank copulas from 
the Archimedean family. 
The Gaussian Copula is presented as: 
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𝐶𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛|𝑅) = 𝜙𝑅 (𝜙
−1(𝑢1), … , 𝜙
1(𝑢𝑛))      (32) 
Where 𝑢1, 𝑢2, … , 𝑢𝑛 follow univariate standard uniform distribution, 𝜙𝑟 denotes the standard 
multivariate Gaussian distribution function with correlation coefficient matrix R, 𝜙−1is the 
inverse function of standard univariate Gaussian distribution. Gaussian copula is very easy to 
use but it does not allow for tail dependence. 
The t-Copula is presented as: 
𝐶𝑡(𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛|𝑣, 𝑅) = 𝑡𝑣,𝑅 (𝑡𝑣
−1(𝑢1), … , 𝑡𝑣
−1(𝑢𝑛))      (33) 
Where 𝑡𝑣,𝑅  denotes the t distribution function with degree of freedom v and correlation 
coefficient matrix R, and 𝑡𝑣
−1 denotes the inverse function of t distribution function. The t-
Copula has the ability to incorporate tail dependence. The lower the degree of freedom, the 
heavier is the tail dependence for a t copula. Gaussian copula is in fact, a limiting case of t 
copula as the degree of freedom approaching ∞. By contrast, t-Copula exhibits the heaviest tail 
dependence as the degree of freedom approaching 1.  
The Gumbel Copula is presented as:  
𝐶𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑙(𝑈1, … , 𝑈𝑛|𝛼) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−[(−𝑙𝑛𝑢1)
𝛼 + ⋯ + (−𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑛)
𝛼]
1
2}, 𝛼 ∈ [1, ∞)  (34) 
Where the larger 𝛼 is, the heavier the dependence is. 𝛼 = 1implies the independence copula 
and as 𝛼  approaches ∞ we obtain the perfect dependence copula. Gumbel copula exhibits 
greater dependence in the right tail than in the left. 
The Clayton copula is presented as: 
𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑡𝑜𝑛(𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛|𝜃) = (𝑢1
−𝜃 + ⋯ + 𝑢𝑛
−𝜃 − 1)
−
1
𝜃, 𝜃 ∈ (0, ∞)    (35) 
Where the larger 𝜃  is, the heavier the dependence is. As 𝜃  approaches 0, we obtain the 
independence copula, whereas as 𝜃 approaches ∞ we obtain the perfect dependence copout. 
Clayton copula exhibits greater dependence in the left tail than in the right. 
Frank Copula is presented as: 
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𝐶𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛|𝜆) = −
1
𝜆
𝑙𝑛 (1 +
(𝑒−𝜆𝑢1−1)…(𝑒−𝜆𝑢𝑛−1)
𝑒−𝜆−1
), 𝜆 ∈ (−∞, ∞)   (36) 
Where Frank copula displays perfect negative dependence for 𝜆 equal to −∞, perfect positive 
dependence for 𝜆 equal to ∞, and independence for 𝜆 equal to 0. The type of copula can only 
capture symmetric dependence and is sensitive to neither left nor right tail dependence. 
Table 3: Overall comparison of the five frequently-used copulas 
 
Source: BCBS (2010) 
Concluding, we can say that there is no single copula that can be applied to all situations, so it 
could be used a mixture of copulas. In fact, Nelson (1999) demonstrates that mixtures of copulas 
are copulas too. With a mixture of copulas, we can generate a dependence structure that does 
not belong to one particular copula family and so we can better capture the interactions between 
credit, market and operational risk. Considering that t-Copula is the most suitable in modeling 
tail dependence, including the negative one, and in allowing asymmetric interactions between 
risks, and that the Gumbel one, on the contrary, is highly symmetric and sensitive to right tail 
dependence, a mixture of the two Copulas can be used. 
𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛|𝑣, 𝑅, 𝛼, 𝑤) = 𝑤𝐶𝑡(𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛|𝑣, 𝑅) + (1 − 𝑤)𝐶𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙(𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛|𝛼) (37) 
Where w denotes the weight of t - copula. This mixture copula exhibits heavier right tail 
dependence and allows asymmetric interactions and negative dependence between risks. 
Copula Type Elliptical Copula Archimedean Copula 
Gaussian t Gumbel Clayton Frank 
Ease of simulation Easy Easy Difficult Difficult Difficult 
Tail dependence No Yes Yes Yes No 
 
Tail simmetry Symmetric Symmetric Asymmetric Asymmetric Symmetric 
Negative 
dependence 
Yes Yes No No Yes 
Structure simmetry Asymmetric  Symmetric   
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Since the Clayton copula captures the left tail dependence, a mixture of t-Copula and Clayton 
one could show heavier left tail dependence. 
Mixture of copulas are more complex but able to reflect more flexibility and to involve more 
parameters 
It is also possible to extend this aggregation model that operates in a single-period framework 
developing a multi-period extension. As Brockmann and Kalkbrener (2010) demonstrated, the 
first setup does not work well for all risk types that are illustrated by a comparison between 
banking book vs risks in the trading book.31 Since banking positions are not actively traded and 
more difficult to hedge than the trading one, it seems justified to use a buy-and-hold assumption 
over the planning period of one year in the economic capital calculations for the banking book. 
The same assumption would clearly overestimate the risk in the trading book: the higher 
liquidity of trading book positions facilitates the implementation of more effective risk 
management strategies. Therefore, Brockmann and Kalkbrener suggested that multi-period 
models provide the natural framework for the specification of portfolio strategies for liquid 
positions. In this setup, the planning period is split into time intervals determined by the 
liquidity horizon of the underlying portfolio The rollover at the end of each period is specified 
by a portfolio strategy. The level of risk is kept constant in this portfolio strategy by rebalancing 
the portfolio at the end of each period. This strategy is in contrast with the assumption of holding 
the same position for the entire planning period of one year. Another basic model assumption 
is the independence of loss distributions in non-overlapping time periods. This is a common 
assumption in risk modeling, which is additionally supported by the fact that rebalancing of the 
portfolio reduces potential autocorrelations, and an asset is typically replaced if its credit quality 
has changed at the end of a liquidity period. Thus, the autocorrelations of rating migrations are 
not relevant for the aggregation of the loss distributions across non-overlapping time periods: 
in order to obtain a cumulative loss over one year, the loss distribution at the liquidity horizon 
is calculated and then re-sampled for the following time periods. This rollover model is then 
extended to the aggregation of risk types with different liquidity horizons. 
                                                 
31 Brockmann Michael, Kalkbrener Michael, On the Aggregation of Risk, Risk Analytics & 
Instruments, Deutsche Bank, Frankfurt, 2010 
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III.2: The interactions between different types of risk 
Determining the economic capital is the core part of financial institution and its calculation is 
the focus risk management strategies. For many reasons, both historical and practical, especially 
market and credit risks have often been treated as if they are unrelated sources of risk. The 
development of credit risk transfer markets and the moves to mark-to-market accounting for 
portions of held-to-maturity banking book positions, however, have blurred distinctions 
between market and credit risk and raise questions regarding approaches that treat the two types 
of risk separately. Market participants have argued that there are significant diversification 
benefits to be reaped from the integrated measurement and management of market and credit 
risks. It is demonstrated that non - linear interactions between market and credit risk could lead 
to compounding effects, which are not captured in standalone risk assessments for the different 
risks.32 
The recent financial crisis has also illustrated how the two risks may reinforce each other and 
generate large losses if not managed jointly.  
As discussed by Grundke (2010), the interaction between different types of risks was clear in 
the context of the subprime crisis, too.33 
In the USA, interest rates were low for the first part of the decade. The funding rate of the 
Federal Reserve Board was 1% in June 2003 and then started to slowly increase in June 2004 
until it was 5.25% in June 2006. Rising interest rates were a problem, in particular, for those 
homeowners who accepted an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) loan. In 2005 and 2006, the 
most common subprime loans were of the so-called ‘‘short-reset” type. These ARM loans had 
a relatively low fixed interest rate for the first two or three years (teaser rate), which was then 
reset semiannually to an index plus a considerable margin for the remaining period. As from 
mid-2004 onwards short-term interest rates and sometime later also mortgage rates began to 
rise, debt service burdens for ARM loans also increased, which caused financial distress for 
                                                 
32 Brockmann Michael, Kalkbrener Michael, On the Aggregation of Risk, Risk Analytics & 
Instruments, Deutsche Bank, Frankfurt, 2010 
33Grundke Peter, Top-down approaches for integrated risk management: How accurate are they?, 
European Journal of Operational Research, n° 203, 2010 
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many homeowners. This was not very surprising because subprime borrowers are typically not 
very creditworthy and are often highly levered with high debt service-to-income ratios. 
Furthermore, the mortgages extended to them have a large loan -to - value ratio, which implies 
that the equity stake of the borrowers is very small. During 2005 and 2006, subprime borrowers 
could even finance 100% of the purchase price of their homes by taking out two mortgages on 
their homes. These events clearly demonstrate that there is indeed a relationship between 
interest rate risk and default risk and, thus, that there is a need for integrated risk management 
approaches that are able to consider these relationships.  
Rising default rates for ARM subprime loans were accompanied by decreasing home prices. 
Thus, the value of the collateral also decreased and the loss given default of the ARM loans 
increased. Of course, rising default rates of homeowners and decreasing home prices were not 
completely independent of each other. On the one hand, an increasing number of liquidations 
of the collateral of those homeowners who were no longer able to service their debts was at 
least responsible for a further decline in home prices. On the other hand, decreasing home prices 
made it impossible for many homeowners with difficulties in servicing their debts, to repay 
their loan prematurely, which caused further defaults.  
The financial crisis also illustrated the significant role that illiquidity can play in such stress 
situations. Liquidity conditions interact with market risk and credit risk through the horizon 
over which assets can be liquidated. In particular, deteriorating market liquidity often forces 
banks to lengthen the horizon over which they can execute their risk management strategies. 
As this time horizon lengthens, overall risk exposures generally increase, as does the 
contribution of credit risk relative to market risk. The liquidity of traded products can vary 
substantially over time and in unpredictable ways. Such liquidity fluctuations, all else equal, 
should have a larger impact on prices of products with greater credit risk. Conversely, as the 
current financial crisis illustrates, valuation uncertainties or other shocks that enhance actual or 
perceived credit risks can have adverse effects on liquidity and put in motion a downward spiral 
between market prices and liquidity of traded credit products. Banks’ exposures to market and 
credit risk depend on their risk management strategies. Because many strategies rely on liquid 
markets for hedging, or for unwinding positions to limit losses on exposures that cannot be 
hedged, asset market liquidity is an important determinant of banks’ overall risk profile. 
Additionally, since liquidity is time varying, and markets typically become less liquid when 
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risk increases appreciably, it became clear that liquidity interacts with other sources of risk.34 
As a consequence, it is suggested to adjust valuation methods in order to take endogenous 
liquidity risk into account (such as computing VaR integrating liquidity risk)35. 
III.3: Examples of top down approaches from the literature 
Rosenberg and Schuermann in 2006 conducted a top-down analysis of a representative large, 
and internationally active bank that uses copulas to construct the joint distribution of losses. 
This allows to incorporate realistic marginal distributions that capture essential skewness and 
fat-tails. The aggregation of market, credit and operational risk requires knowledge of the 
marginal distributions of the risk components as well as their relative weights. Rosenberg and 
Schuermann assign inter-risk correlations and specify a copula, such as the Student-t copula, 
which captures tail dependence as a function of the degrees of freedom. They impose 
correlations of 50% for market and credit risk, and 20% for the other two correlations with 
operational risk. They find several interesting results, such as that changing the inter- risk 
correlation between market and credit risk has a relatively small impact on total risk compared 
to changes in the correlation of operational risk with the other risk types. The authors examine 
the sensitivity of their risk estimates to business mix, dependence structure, risk measure, and 
estimation method. Overall, they find that “assumptions about operational exposures and 
correlations are much more important for accurate risk estimates than assumptions about 
relative market and credit exposures or correlations”36. Comparing their VaR measures for the 
0.1% tail to the sum of the three different VaR measures for the three risk types, they find 
                                                 
34 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Findings on the interactions of market and credit risk, 
Working paper n. 16, Bank for International Settlements, May 2009 
35 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Messages from the academic literature on risk 
measurement for the trading book, Working Paper n. 19, Bank for International Settlements, January 
2011  
36Rosemberg Joshua V., Schuermann Til, A general approach to integrated risk management with 
skewed, fat-tailed risks, Journal of Financial Economics, n° 79, 2006 
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diversification benefits in all cases. Their results suggest values ranging from 0.42 to 0.89. They 
found similar results when the expected shortfall (ES) measure is used.  
Rosenberg and Schuermann authors stated that the sum of the separate risk measures is always 
the most conservative and overestimates risk, “since it fixes the correlation matrix at unity, 
when in fact the empirical correlations are much lower”. While the statement of imposing unit 
correlation is mathematically correct, it is based on the assumption that the risk categories can 
be linearly separated. If that assumption were not correct the linear correlations could actually 
be greater than one and lead to risk compounding37. 
Inanoglu and Jacobs in their paper “Models for risk aggregation and sensitivity analysis: an 
application to bank economic capital” (2009) estimated and compared alternative frameworks. 
First, they extended the scope of the analysis to liquidity and interest rate risk. Second, they 
utilized actual data representative of five major banking institutions’ loss experience, extracted 
from call reports and submitted by banks to supervisory agencies, in order to explore the impact 
of business mix and inter-risk correlations on total risk. Third, they estimated alternative copula 
models and established a framework for capturing realistic distributional features of different 
risk types (e.g., non-normality) and cohesively combining such, on the same data-set. Then, 
they compared the models to several conventional approaches and they applied the goodness-
of-fit (GOF) tests to the various copula models. They observed a wide divergence in measured 
VaR, diversification benefits as well as the sampling variation across different risk aggregation 
methodologies and types of institutions and they observed that, contrary to asymptotic theory, 
empirical copula simulation (ECS) tends to produce the highest absolute magnitudes of VaR 
with respect to standard copula formulations (e.g. Gaussian copula simulation) on the order of 
about 20% to 30%, while the Var-Covar approximation tends to understate risk. The 
proportional diversification benefits, measured by the relative VaR reduction with the 
assumption of perfect correlation, exhibit wide variation across banks and aggregation 
techniques. The ECS generally yields the highest values relative the other methodologies (127% 
to 243%), while the Archimadean Gumbel copula (AGCS) is the lowest (10-21%). They 
concluded that while the ECS may overstate absolute risk, proportional diversification benefits 
                                                 
37 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Messages from the academic literature on risk 
measurement for the trading book, Working Paper n° 19, Bank for International Settlements, January 
31st, 2011 
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may be understated by standard methodologies on the order of about 15% to 30%. Through 
differences observed across the five largest banks, they failed to find the effect of business mix 
to exert a directionally consistent impact on total integrated diversification benefits. In the GOF 
tests, they found mixed results: in many cases most of the copula methods exhibit poor fit to 
the data relative to the ECS, with the Archimadean copulas fitting worse than the Gaussian or 
Student-t copulas. They found also that the variability of the VaR is significantly lower for the 
ECS and higher for Var-Covar, as compared to other copula formulations. Given the 
conservatism and stability of the ECS methodology, the poor performance of the standard 
methodologies in GOF analysis, and the lack of consensus upon the best copula to use, they 
concluded that the ECS method is most robust. 
Elsinger and Lehar in 2006 proposed an approach to assess systemic financial stability of the 
Austrian banking industry using a network model of interbank loans, using a cross section of 
all 881 Austrian reporting banks in September 2002 from MAUS database. They performed an 
aggregation of the same types of risks of all the 881 banks and figured out aggregate losses due 
to credit, market and operational risk respectively. Li et Al. Used this study to perform a higher 
level of risk aggregation: the aggregated credit, market and operational risk to calculate the total 
risk of Austrian banking industry using the different approaches I discussed above.38 
These are the data extracted from Elsinger and Lehar (2006), showing mean values and standard 
deviation of loss due to credit, market and operational risks, in million Euros and in percentage 
of total assets. The loss rate is loss divided by the corresponding risk exposure. 
  
                                                 
38Li, J., Zhu, X., Lee, C., Wu, D., Feng, J., Shi, Y., On the aggregation of credit, market and operational 
risks, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Volume 44, Issue 1: 161-189, 2015 
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Table 4: Statistics of loss of the entire Austrian banking industry 
 Credit risk loss Market risk loss Operational risk loss Total assets 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  
MillionEuros 971 800 -36 2,805 883 30 575,000 
% of total 
assets 
0.17 0.14 -0.01 0.49 0.15 0.01  
 
In this table, the time horizons of loss due to credit and operational risk are 1 year and the time horizon 
of loss due to market risk is 10 days. % of total assets denotes the loss rate which equals loss divided by 
total assets. The data of operational risk loss are from e-companion of Elsinger and Lehar (2006).  
SD = standard deviation 
Source: Elsingeret Al.(2006) 
Credit, market and operational loss rates are assumed to follow respectively beta, normal and 
lognormal distributions. 
Table 5: Parameters of credit, market and operational risk loss rate distributions 
Credit risk Market risk Operational risk 
Distribution Parameters Distribution Parameters (%) Distribution Parameters 
Beta p 1.47 Normal 𝜇𝑚 -0.01 Log-normal 𝜇𝑜 -6.51 
 q 863.24  𝜎𝑚 0.49  𝜎𝑜 0.07 
 
Source: Li et Al. (2015) 
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Figure 6: Credit, market and operational loss rate distributions 
 
Source: Li et Al. (2015) 
Table 6: VaRs of credit, market and operational risk at different confidence levels  
Confidencel
evel 
90% 95% 99% 99,5% 99,9% 99,97% 
Credit risk 2,046 2,562 3,725 4,217 5,345 6,179 
Market risk 3,553 4,577 6,497 7,200 8,649 9,611 
Operational
risk 
937 960 1,005 1,022 1,057 1,082 
 
Source: Li et Al. (2015) 
The correlation matrix used in the Li et Al. study is the IFRI/CRO39 one: 
(
1 0,66 0,3
1 0,3
1
) 
                                                 
39International Financial Risk Institute Foundation and Chief Risk Officer Forum, Insights from the 
joint IFRI/CRO, Forum Survey on economic capital practice and applications, KPMG Business 
Advisory Services, 2007 
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where 0,66 is the correlation coefficient of credit and market risk; 0,3 is the correlation 
coefficient between credit and operational risk; 0,3 is the correlation coefficient between market 
risk and operational risk. 
The following tables, show the total VaRs estimated respectively using the simple summation, 
Var-Covar and Copula approaches. 
Table 7: Total VaR estimated by using simple summation approach 
Confidence level 90% 95% 99% 99,5% 99,9% 99,97% 
Simple summation 6,537 8,099 11,227 12,438 15,051 16,051 
Unit: million Euros 
Table 8: Total VaR estimated by using the Var-Covar approach 
Confidence level 90% 95% 99% 99,5% 99,9% 99,97% 
Var-Covar 5,517 6,930 9,757 10,851 13,206 14,845 
Unit: million Euros 
Table 9: Copulas approach: copulas used and parameter assumption 
Copula types Parameters Features 
Gaussian copula R Not any tail dependence 
t - copula (1 df) v = 1, R Explicit tail dependence 
t - copula (10 df) v = 10, R Weak tail dependence 
Mixture copula v = 1, 𝛼 = 5, w = 0,5, R Heavier right tail dependence 
Mixture copula consists of t - copula and Gumbel copula, R is the IFRI/CRO correlation matrix. 
 
Source: Li et Al. (2015) 
 
We can observe that with the simple summation approach and the Var-Covar approach, as the 
confidence level increases, the total VaR becomes larger. 
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In the Copula approach, the total risk distribution can be derived by Monte Carlo Simulation. 
In their study, Li et Al. use four types of copula functions, as described in Table 7. 
The following figure describes the 3-dimensional scatter plot of these four copulas: 
Figure 7: 3-Dimensional scatter plot of different copulas 
Source: Li et Al. (2015 
 
We can notice that Gaussian copula doesn’t show any tail dependence. The t copula (1 df) 
shows a clear view of symmetric tail dependence. The t copula (10 df) is very close to Gaussian 
copula. Compared with t copula (1 df), mixture copula exhibits a heavier right tail dependence. 
The four copulas give four typical cases of risk dependence.  
 68 
 
For each of the four copula functions, 1000000 observations are generated by Monte Carlo 
simulation, consuming about 20 s. After the joint loss rates are obtained based on these 
observations and marginal loss rate distributions, the total loss rate can be calculated by adding 
joint loss rates. Then, 1000000 total loss rates are derived for each copula. Based on the total 
loss rate distribution, finally the total VaR can be calculated. Different copulas lead to different 
total loss rate distributions and mainly affect tail shapes. Consequently, different tail shapes 
result in different total VaRs. 
Table 10: Total VaR estimated by using different copula approaches 
Confidence 
level 
90% 95% 99% 99,5% 99,9% 99,97% 
Gaussian 
copula 
6,177 7,555 10,291 11,363 13,585 15,239 
t - copula (1 
df) 
6,155 7,554 10,361 11,486 13,942 15,667 
t - copula (10 
df) 
6,050 7,542 10,639 11,860 14,564 16,413 
Mixture 
copula 
6,281 7,815 10,941 12,196 14,844 16,696 
Unit: million Euros 
Source: Li et Al. (2015) 
Looking at the same copula, as the confidence level increases, total VaR becomes larger. 
Therefore, if high confidence level is required by the regulatory commission, VaR is larger and 
so is the required economic capital. At the same confidence level, total VaRs from different 
copulas are different. The heavier the tail dependence of the copula is, the larger is the total 
VaR. This can be explained by the fact that extreme losses are more likely to occur 
simultaneously and frequently based on heavy tail dependence, which finally leads to more 
extreme total loss rate in general.  
In the following table, Li et Al. (2015) have calculated VaR ratios by dividing the total VaRs 
of different approaches by the total assets. 
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Table 11: VaR ratios (unit = %) 
Confidence 
level 
90% 95% 99% 99,5% 99,9% 99,97% 
Simple 
summation 
1,14 1,41 1,95 2,16 2,62 2,93 
Var-Covar 0,96 1,21 1,70 1,89 2,30 2,58 
Gaussian 
copula 
1,07 1,31 1,79 1,98 2,36 2,65 
t - copula (1 
df) 
1,07 1,31 1,80 2,00 2,42 2,72 
t - copula (10 
df) 
1,05 1,31 1,85 2,06 2,53 2,85 
Mixture 
copula 
1,09 1,36 1,90 2,12 2,58 2,90 
 
Source: Li et Al. (2015) 
By comparing the Total VaRs, we can conclude that: 
• As the confidence level increases, the VaR ratio becomes larger. Thus, banks should be 
cautious in choosing proper confidence level: a high confidence level may be too 
conservative, and a low one could not cover regular risks. BCBS recommends 99,9% as a 
proper confidence level. 
• As the confidence level increases, the differences between VaR ratios based on different 
approaches become greater. At high confidence levels of 99.9 and 99.97 %, different 
approaches affect the aggregation results significantly and at lower confidence levels, 
differences between aggregation results from different approaches are relatively small. As 
mentioned above, 99.9 % is the confidence level specified by BCBS, so the banks should be 
prudent in choosing the appropriate aggregation approach since if the chosen aggregation 
approach is not suitable for the banks, the aggregation results can be very inaccurate.  
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• VaR ratios based on simple summation approach are the largest at all the six confidence 
levels. Simple summation is the briefest approach to aggregate the different types of risks by 
simply adding them up. Because it assumes the correlations between the risks are perfect, it 
ignores potential diversification benefits and is generally perceived as a conservative 
approach. In summary, simple summation approach imposes an upper bound on the true 
economic capital requirement.  
• VaR ratios based on Var-Covar approach are significantly the smallest. Var-Covar approach 
only use a matrix of linear correlations which provides a poor metric for capturing tail 
dependence between risks. Copulas, by contrast, are capable of specifying a full dependence 
structure, not only linear dependence. So, it is natural that the lines of all copulas are above 
Var-Covar approach. 
• All VaR ratios based copulas are between VaR ratios based on Var-Covar approach and 
simple summation approach and slightly different from each other. Simple summation is too 
conservative for assumption of perfect correlation and Var-Covar is always considered as too 
simplified for assumption of linear correlation. In contrast to them, copula approach provides 
a more flexible way to describe dependence and offers many choices for different types of 
bank. At 95 % or higher confidence level, the larger the degree of freedom is, the smaller the 
VaR ratio from a t copula is. The degree of freedom of t - copula ranges from 1 to ∞, which 
indicates t - copula is able to provide a series of dependence with fine distinctions. The VaR 
ratio from mixture copula is merely next to simple summation approach. So if t - copula (1 
df) is still not conservative enough, the mixture of t - copula and Gumbel copula is a good 
choice. 
  
 71 
 
CHAPTER IV: BOTTOM - UP APPROACHES FOR BANK RISK 
AGGREGATION 
IV.1: Top-down vs Bottom-up approaches: the interactions between market and 
credit risk in the literature 
In Chapter III we have seen that within the top-down approach the marginal distributions of 
losses resulting from the different risk types are determined separately and then aggregated. 
Traditionally, credit and market risk are treated independently, and it is thought that credit risk 
is mainly relevant for the banking book, and market risk for the trading book. The separation 
between credit and market risk mimics the traditional organization within banks into credit 
departments and a market investment department. Top-down approaches assume that under a 
sub-additive risk measure, the risk of the total portfolio will be smaller than / almost equal to 
the sum of the risk of the banking book and of the trading book, and that credit risk is only 
relevant for the banking book and market risk for the banking book. As a consequence, under 
all sub additive risk measures, total risk will be smaller or almost equal to the sum of credit and 
market risk. Is it always true? In many situations, a split into credit and market risk is not 
possible because some positions will simultaneously depend on market and credit factors. 
Enforcing a separation between two portfolios could lead to a wrong assessment of the true 
risk. 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, standard credit models are constructed from four 
parameters: the probability of default (PD), the exposure at default (EAD), the loss given 
default (LGD) and default correlations. In this scenario, market risk derived from market price 
movements, plays no role. Breuer et Al. 40 discussed the ways market and credit risk interact 
with each other. In their opinion, the PD may depend on market prices, like interest rates, 
exchange rates and commodity prices. If the payment obligation of the counterparty increases, 
it is much more likely to default. The EAD may depend on market prices, too, because the 
discounted value of a loan depends on the interest rate at which future payments are discounted, 
and if the loan is in a foreign currency, the value depends also on the exchange rate. As regard 
                                                 
40Breuer T., Jandačka M., Rheinberger K., Summer M., Compounding effects between Market 
and Credit Risk: the case of variable rate loans, London, 2008 
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to the LGD, it depends on market risk factors too: for example, the LDG of mortgages increases 
if the real estate price drop. The authors noticed that there is a connection between PD and 
LGD: if banks liquidate collaterals because their PD increase, this could lead to an increase 
supply of the collaterals that will reduce their value. In addition, defaults may increase exposure 
to market risk; in fact, positions hedged against market risk might suddenly be exposed because 
on side of the hedge defaults. 
Considering all these interactions between market and credit risk, it is possible to use bottom - 
up approaches instead of the top - down ones, because they allow to model and measure 
simultaneously different risk types and there is no need for a later aggregation of risk-specific 
economic capital numbers. 
Grundke (2008) 41  compared the two approaches, top-down vs bottom up (developed by 
extending CreditMetrics) and find out that the previous one can underestimate the true risk 
measure of economic capital. In addition, the performance of top-down approaches, in his 
opinion, could be influenced by the accuracy of the marginal loss distributions, of the employed 
copula function and of the loss definitions. 
Breuer, Jandača and Rheinberger (2010)42 proposed an analysis of hypothetical loan portfolios 
for which the impact of market and credit risk fluctuations are not separable. They argue that 
changes in aggregate portfolio value caused by market and credit risk fluctuations in isolation 
should sum up to the integrated change incorporating all risk interactions very rarely. 
They suppose that market and credit risk are computed for a common time horizon, while 
market risk is usually computed over a ten days-time-horizon and credit risk over one year 
horizon. 
How market and credit risk may interact? In credit risk analysis PDs may depend on market 
prices, which are linked to interest rates or exchange rates. If these types of risks move 
adversely, there could implicate default. Another interaction between market and credit risk 
                                                 
41Grundke Peter, Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Approaches in Risk Management, 2008 
42Breuer T., Jandačka M., Rheinberger K., Does adding up of economic capital for market 
and credit risk amount to conservative risk assessment?, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
April 2010 
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over the same time horizon is given by the fact that if collaterals are Market to Market, the Loss 
Given Default may depend on market risk factor, too. Breuer et Al. In their paper talk about the 
“wrong way exposure” problem, which is defined as the risk that occurs when the exposure to 
a counterparty is adversely correlated with the credit quality of the counterparty itself. It arises 
when default risk and credit exposure increase together, that is when there are high PDs and 
high exposure at the same time. The authors try to capture this “wrong way exposure” via the 
payment obligation process, which captures the dependence between PD and exposure and 
between macro risk factors. 
If on one hand PDs may depend on market prices, on the other hand PDs can affect them: if 
PDs increase and banks have to liquidate collaterals, their value would decrease. As a 
consequence, it may exist such a loop from credit to market risk and back to credit risk. Breuer 
et al. (2010) used the following approach: they analyzed all the risk factors, without considering 
if they are market or credit risks. Simply adding up market and credit risk in determining the 
economic capital, could lead to an underestimation, in case of “malign” interaction between the 
two risks, or an overestimation, in case of “benign” interaction. 
The authors first analyzed the logic of risk underestimation in theory through an example on 
foreign currency loans, and then they extend the model to the real world, proposing an 
integrated market and credit risk model with a stochastic default barrier defined by the payment 
obligation of the customer, which depends on both the two risks and captures the relation 
between interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations, and between PD and LGD. An increase in 
default risk trigged by adverse interest rate and exchange rate moves is the principal risk of 
Foreign Currency Loans (FX loans). This risk cannot be captured by a pure credit risk or market 
risk model, nor by a simple integrated model. 
The model presented by Breuer et al. (2010) is the following one. The portfolio of loans has N 
obligors indexed by I = 1, …, N. The loans are underwritten at the initial time t = 0. An obligor 
takes a loan of 𝑙𝑖/𝑓(0) units in a foreign currency in order to receive the home currency amount 
𝑙𝑖. The bank borrows 𝑙𝑖/𝑓(0) units of the foreign currency on the interbank market. At time  t 
= 1 (i.e. after one year) the loan expires and the bank repays the foreign currency on the 
interbank market with an interest rate 𝑟𝑓  and it claims a home currency amount from the 
customer which is exchanged at the rate f (1) to the foreign currency amount 
(𝑙𝑖/𝑓(0))(1 + 𝑟 + 𝑠𝑓). This is the initial loan plus interest 𝑟𝑓 rolled over from four quarters 
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plus a spread 𝑠𝑓. The customer’s payment obligation to the bank at time 1 in the home currency 
is: 
𝑜𝑖 = 𝑙𝑖(1 + 𝑟𝑓)𝑓(1)/𝑓(0) + 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑓(1)/𝑓(0)   (38) 
The first term on the right hand is what the bank has to repay on the interbank market, the 
second term is the spread profit of the bank. For a home currency loan the payment obligation 
would be 𝑜𝑖 = 𝑙𝑖(1 + 𝑟ℎ + 𝑠ℎ), where 𝑟ℎ  is the interest rate in home currency and 𝑠ℎ  is the 
spread to be paid by the customer on a home currency loan. Whether an obligor will be able to 
meet this obligation depends on his payment ability 𝑎𝑖. He will default if his payment ability is 
smaller than his payment obligation, i.e. if 𝑎𝑖 < 𝑜𝑖. In this case the customer pays 𝑎𝑖 instead of 
𝑜𝑖.  
The profit of the bank with obligor I is:  
𝑉𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑎𝑖, 𝑜𝑖) − 𝑙𝑖(1 + 𝑟𝑓)𝑓(1)/𝑓(0)       (39) 
Where 𝑓(0) is the known exchange rate at time t = 0, 𝑓(1)and r are random variables. In the 
profit function (39), the first term is what the obligor repays and the second term is what the 
bank has to pay on the interbank market.  
In this model, the payment ability of the obligator is modeled as a function of macroeconomic 
conditions and an idiosyncratic risk component. At the final time  t = 1, it is: 
𝑎𝑖(1) = 𝑎𝑖(0) ⋅
𝐺𝐷𝑃(1)
𝐺𝐷𝑃(2)
. ∈,  
𝑙𝑜𝑔(∈) ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎)          (40) 
Where 𝑎(0)  is a constant, and 𝜇 =
−𝜎2
2
 ensuring 𝐸(∈) = 1 . For different obligors the 
realizations ∈𝑖 are independent of each other and of GDP. 
GDP (0) is the known GDP at time  t= 0, GDP (1) is a random variable. The distribution of ∈𝑖 
reflects obligor specific random events, like losing or changing job. The support of ∈𝑖 is (0, ∞) 
because 𝑎𝑖 cannot be less than 0: in that case the obligor have no lines of credit open with the 
bank. 
 75 
 
Since the expected value of ∈𝑖 is 1 and ∈ is independent of GDP, the expectation of 𝑎𝑖(1) is 
𝑎𝑖(0) times the expectation of 
𝐺𝐷𝑃(1)
𝐺𝐷𝑃(0)
.  
Figure 8: Plots of density function of the payment ability distribution, with GDP equal to its 
expected value (solid line), and GDP equal to ± 3 standard deviations. 
Source: Breuer T., Jandača M., Rheinberger K. (2010) 
In this figure, we notice that a GDP increase lead to an increase in all quantiles, and shifts the 
payment ability distribution to the right. It increases distance to default and reduces default 
probabilities.  
The independency between ∈𝑖 implies that customers default are independent, too. 
The initial payment ability 𝑎𝑖(0) is determined in the loan approval procedure. Assume that a 
bank, for instance, gives loans only if they have 𝑎𝑖(0) equal to 1,2 times the loan amount. This 
is an extra margin that is considered in the rating. Banks use the rating system in order to 
determine the default probability 𝑝𝑖 of customers. The payment ability distribution satisfies this 
condition: 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃[𝑎𝑖(1) < 𝑜𝑖]          (41) 
Where 𝑎𝑖(1) is a function of 𝜎 and 𝑜𝑖 is a function of the spreads, that are set to achieve some 
target expected profit for each loan (42): 
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𝐸(𝑉𝑖(𝜎, 𝑠)) = 𝐸𝑃𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡         (42) 
Where 𝑉𝑖 is the profit with obligor i and 𝐸𝑃𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 is some target expected profit. The two free 
parameters 𝜎 and s are determined from these two conditions.  
The authors show then how market and credit risk interact in this mode. 
At t = 1 the bank has met its obligation at the interbank market, and has a net foreign currency 
position 𝑠𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑓(1)/𝑓(0) for obligor i. For this part of the position, current regulation requires 
market risk capital. On the other hand, default risk is determined by the probability that payment 
ability falls below payment obligation, and, as a consequence, it depends on both interest rate 
and exchange rate. Thus, default risk is a function of market risk factors and an integrated risk 
analysis is required. 
The authors use the GVAR time series model of Pesaran et al. (2000)43 , that is an error 
correction model that allows a parsimonious modeling of economic interdependence between 
countries or regions.  
It involves exchange rate, interest rates and macroeconomic interactions between Austria and 
Switzerland because it allows the global model to be built from separately estimated country 
models with foreign variables trade weighted averages. Country models can be estimated 
separately and stacked into a global model without re-estimating parameters. The authors 
estimate a GVAR model for Switzerland and Austria and include their three most important 
trading partners (Germany, Italy and France) and the most important trading partner of 
Germany, that is the USA. They consider the following variables for each country: real GDP, 
that is the three months LIBOR interest rate, and the exchange rate to the US dollar. The model 
is based on quarterly data from 1980q1 and 2005q4, and the authors use the above equations to 
simulate the distribution for the loan portfolio. They use Monte Carlo simulation of 100000 
draws from the distribution of f (1), GDP, and r, in order to calculate the distribution of profit 
V. They calculate also defaults of customers’ payment ability from the distribution of the 
payment ability process. 
  
                                                 
43 Pesaran H., Shin Y., Smith R., Structural analysis of vector error correction models with 
exogenous i(1) variable, Journal of Econometrics, 97:293-343, 2000 
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Table 12: Estimated values for means and covariates of logarithm of the macro risk factors 
 GDP 𝒓𝑬𝑼𝑹 𝒓𝑪𝑯𝑭 CHR/EUR 
Mean 5,446 1,246 0,556 0,423 
Std. dev. 0,097 1,870 6,301 0,387 
Correlations 
GDP 1,000 0,291 0,217 -0,040 
𝒓𝑬𝑼𝑹  1,000 0,519 0,140 
𝒓𝑪𝑯𝑭   1,000 0,007 
CHR/EUR    1,000 
 
Source: Breuer et al. (2010) 
If the portfolio has N = 100 loans of 𝑙𝑖 = € 10000 taken out in CHF by customers in the rating 
class B+, corresponding to a default probability of 𝑝𝑖  = 2%, or in rating class BBB+, 
corresponding to a default probability of 𝑝𝑖 = 0,1%. As said before, the bank gives loans to 
customers with 𝑎𝑖(0) equal to 1,2 times the loan amount.  
The authors compare the sum of market plus credit risk capital to capital required to cover 
integrated risk in order to quantify the interactions between market and credit risk. The common 
time horizon is set at 1 year, under the assumption that all loans are underwritten at time 0 and 
expire at time 1. The spreads 𝑠𝑓 and 𝑠ℎ for each rating class are set to have an expected profit 
on each loan of € 160, which amounts to a 20% return on an assumed capital charge of € 800 
for a loan of € 10000. 
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Table 13: Spreads of rating classes 
Rating Loan Type 𝝈 Spread [bp] 
BBB+ Home 0,0491 160,15 
B+ Home 0,0736 165,62 
BBB+ Foreign 0,0363 162,29 
B+ Foreign 0,0755 168,97 
Source: Breuer et al.. (2010) 
We have to notice that in the same rating class spread for FX loans are higher than for home 
currency loans, and that a customer with a given standard deviation 𝜎 in his payment ability, 
will be in a higher rating class for a home currency loan, and in a lower class for a FX loan. 
Market risk factor are 𝑒: = (𝑟𝑓 − 𝑓(1)) for foreign currency loans and 𝑒: = (𝑟ℎ) for home 
currency loans. Credit risk factors are 𝑎: = (𝐺𝐷𝑃, ∈𝑖)𝑖=1…,𝑁, and the portfolio value function is 
𝑉 = ∑
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑉𝑖.            (43) 
𝑒0: = 𝐸(𝑒) are the expected values of the market risk factors and 𝑎0: = (𝐸(𝐺𝐷𝑃), ∈𝑖= ∞)𝑖=1,…,𝑁 
, which implies that no obligor defaults. The authors compare the distribution of integrated risk 
𝛥𝑉(𝑎, 𝑒) to the sum 𝛥𝐶𝑎 + 𝛥𝑀𝑒  of the distributions of market and credit risk by their Expected 
Shortfall at different quantiles 𝛼4. For a profit distribution, risk capital is calculated as: 
𝑅𝐶𝛼(𝑥): = 𝐸(𝑋) − 𝐸𝑆𝛼(𝑋)         (44) 
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Table 14: Risk capital for market, credit, and integrated risks of the FX portfolio. 
Source: Breuer T., Jandača M., Rheinberger K. (2010) 
The table shows malign risk interaction for all quantiles𝛼  and in both the rating classes. 
Integrated risk capital is higher than the sum of credit and market risk capital. Thus, separate 
analysis underestimates true risk. In addition, holding separate risk capital for market and credit 
risk is not sufficient to capture the main risk for FX loans, that is the danger of increased defaults 
trigged by adverse exchange rate moves. 
Table 15:  Risk capital for market, credit, and integrated risks of the home currency loan 
portfolio 
Source: Breuer T., Jandača M., Rheinberger K. (2010) 
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There is negative risk interaction also for home currency loans, because default rates depends 
on the home interest rate, that are reflected in payment obligation changes. Also in this case, 
separate analysis underestimates true risk factors. The negative risk interaction for home 
currency loans is smaller than for foreign currency loans, because the payment obligation of 
home currency loans is less sensitive on market factor changes. 
Breuer et al. (2010) concluded that often it is not possible to separate a portfolio between a 
market and a credit component, because portfolio positions depend simultaneously on both 
risks, just think about the exchange rate in FX loans portfolio, that is both a market and a credit 
risk factor. If for such a portfolio market risk and credit risk are calculated separately, this could 
lead to a wrong assessment of true portfolio risk. 
In a previous study of 2008, Breuer et al. used a similar analytical framework to examine 
variable rate loans as regard to the interactions between market and credit risk. They modeled 
the dependence of credit risk factors, such as the loans’ default probabilities (PD), exposure at 
default (EAD), and loss-given-default (LGD), on the interest rate environment. A key risk of 
variable rate loans is the danger of increased defaults triggered by adverse rate moves. For these 
loans, market and credit risk factors cannot be readily separated, and their individual risk 
measures cannot be readily aggregated back to a unified risk measure. The authors conducted 
a simulation study based on portfolios of 100 loans of equal size by borrowers rated B+ or 
BBB+ over a one-year horizon using the expected shortfall measure at various tail percentiles. 
They find that the ratio of unified expected shortfall to the sum of the separate expected 
shortfalls is slightly greater than one, suggesting that risk compounding effects can occur. 
Furthermore, these compounding effects are more pronounced for lower-rated loans and higher 
loan-to-value ratios.44 
                                                 
44Breuer T., Jandačka M., Rheinberger K., Summer M., Compounding effcts between Market and 
Credit Risk: the case of variable rate loans, London, 2008 
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Barnhill et al (2000)., in their study “Measuring Integrated Market and Credit Risk in Bank 
Portfolios: An Application to a set of Hypothetical Banks Operating in South Africa” 45 
presented a numerical solution based on a simulation model that links changes in the relevant 
variables that characterize the financial environment and the distribution of possible future bank 
capital ratios, measuring both market and credit risk together. The authors develop a model for 
an application to various hypothetical banks operating in the South African financial 
environment and assess the correlated market and credit risks associated with business lending, 
mortgage lending, asset and liability maturity matches, foreign lending and borrowing, and 
direct equity, real estate, and gold investments. It is shown to produce simulated financial 
environments (interest rates, exchange rates, equity indices, real estate price indices, 
commodity prices, and economic indicators) that match closely the assumed parameters, and 
generate reasonable credit transition probabilities and security prices. The credit quality and 
diversification characteristics of the loan portfolio, asset and liability maturity mismatches, and 
financial environment volatility, interact to determine bank risk levels. They find that the credit 
quality of a bank’s loan portfolio is the most important risk factor, and show the risk reduction 
benefits of diversifying the loan portfolio across various sectors and regions of the economy 
and the importance of accounting for volatility shocks that occur periodically in emerging 
economies. Banks with high credit risk and concentrated portfolios are shown to have a high 
risk of failure during periods of financial stress. Alternatively, banks with lower credit risk and 
broadly diversified loan portfolios across business and mortgage lending are unlikely to fail 
even during very volatile periods.  
  
                                                 
45Barnhill T. B., Panagiotis P., Schumacher L., Measuring Integrated Market and Credit Risk in 
Bank Portfolios: An Application to a set of Hypothetical Banks Operating in South Africa, 
IMF Working paper #2000-212 
 82 
 
Figure 9: Bank risk levels under typical and high credit risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Barnhill et Al.  (2002) 
They demonstrated also that asset and liability maturity gaps generally increase bank risk levels. 
However, because credit losses are positively correlated with interest rate increases, banks with 
high credit risk may reduce overall risk levels by holding liabilities with longer maturities than 
their assets. This occurs because rising net interest rate income resulting from rising interest 
rates offsets rising credit losses. 
 
 
  
 83 
 
Figure 10: Bank risk levels under zero, positive, and negative maturity gaps for a high market 
risk environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Barnhill et Al. (2002) 
The authors concluded that risk assessment methodologies which measure market and credit 
risk separately do not capture these various interactions and thus misestimate overall risk levels: 
single risks are not additive and need to be evaluated as a set of correlated risks.  
Kupiec (2007)46 proposes a single-factor, migration-style credit risk model, measuring the 
market risks of the non-defaulting credits in an asymptotic portfolio. The MTM value 
distribution are derived and then calibrated using historical data on the market yields of 
alternative credit quality instruments. The model incorporates correlations between portfolio 
default rates, credit migration probabilities and credit-quality specific market yields. The 
integrated exposure distribution of the model is used to examine capital allocations at various 
thresholds. These integrated capital allocations are compared to the separated assessments. The 
results show that capital allocations derived from a unified risk measure importantly alter the 
estimates of the minimum capital needed to achieve a given target solvency margin. The capital 
                                                 
46Kupiec P. H., An integrated structural model for portfolio market and credit risk, Federal Deposits 
Insurance Corporation, 2007 
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amount could be larger or smaller than capital allocations estimated from compartmentalized 
risk measures. Regarding specifically the Basel II AIRB approach, the author argues that the 
results show that no further diversification benefit is needed for banking book positions since 
no market risk capital is required. Thus, Basel II AIRB capital requirements fall significantly 
short of the capital required by a unified risk measure.  
Numerically speaking, the risk measure used in this study is the amount of capital that the 
unified and the compartmentalized capital approaches generate as the appropriate value to 
assure funding costs of a certain magnitude calibrated to historical funding rates for specific 
credit ratings. The hypothetical portfolios of interest are corporate loans with various rating 
categories represented in proportion to historical data. The author examines a wide variety of 
alternative separated approaches with which to calculate economic capital measures, ranging 
from three different alternative credit risk models to several methods for measuring market risk. 
Correspondingly, the range of inter-risk diversification index values is quite wide for the AAA- 
and BBB-rated portfolios, ranging from about 0,60 to almost 4,00. In summary, the author’s 
capital calculations show that capital allocations derived from a unified market and credit risk 
measure can be larger or smaller than capital allocations that are estimated from aggregated 
compartmentalized risk measures.  
IV.2: How interest rate risk may interact with credit risk 
The studies discussed above examine the different risk implications of a unified risk 
measurement approach relative to a compartmentalized approach for specific portfolios, taking 
into consideration credit risk and market risk. 
Several authors consider Interest Rate risk as the most important source of market risk for 
commercial banks. Thus, there are papers in which the interactions between credit and interest 
rate risk are specifically treated. 
Drehmann et al. (2010)47 propose a general framework to measure the riskiness of banks which 
are subject to correlated interest rate and credit shocks, incorporating the integrated impact of 
the two risks. They model a whole portfolio of banks, in which assets, liabilities, and off-
                                                 
47Drehmann M., Sorensen S., Stringa M., The integrated impact of credit and interest rate risk on banks: 
an economic value and capital adequacy perspective, Working paper no. 339, Bank of England, January 
2008 
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balance-sheet items are included; they take into account the repricing structure of the portfolio, 
too. Their analysis is based on two conditions: one on economic value and one on capital 
adequacy. The former is based on risk-adjusted discounting cash flows and involve a 
framework which takes into account the repricing structure of the portfolio and capture the 
interactions between credit and interest rate risk. In fact, interest rate risk is the cause of the 
repricing mismatch: assets and liabilities are repriced to reflect changes in the free-risk yield 
curve; in addition, credit spreads could be adjusted to reflect changes in the banks’ or 
borrowers’ credit risk. The authors capture these two effects modeling the bank’s net interest 
income. 
The latter conditions imply to calculate whether the economic value of assets falls below the 
face value of liabilities, that is, in other words, whether a bank would be sufficiently well 
capitalized in the short to medium term. They propose a framework that captures the impact of 
credit risk on the whole portfolio, the interest rate risk stemming from the repricing mismatch 
between assets, liabilities and off balance sheet positions as well as basis and yield curve risk, 
and the interdependence between credit and interest rate risk. 
The framework is a severe macro-stress scenario, which implies a sharp rise in the risk-free 
yield curve, in order to assess the exposure to credit and interest rate risk of a hypothetical bank. 
The simulation made, confirm that interest rate risk and credit risk must be assessed jointly for 
the whole portfolio to gauge overall risk correctly. To capture the combined impact of these 
two risks, they employ a bottom-up approach linking macroeconomics factors to the risk-free 
yield curve and PDs of companies and households.  
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Figure 11: Interaction of interest and credit risk - the impact on write-offs 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Interaction of interest and credit risk - the impact on net interest income 
Figure 12: Interaction of interest and credit risk - the impact on net profits 
Source: Drehman et Al. (2008) 
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As seen in the three figures above, in comparison to other macroeconomic factors, interest rates 
are the key drivers of the rise in credit risk. The increase in credit risk has two opposing effects 
on net interest income: higher write-offs decrease net interest income as borrowers default on 
coupon payments and the bank’s exposures decline over time; on the other hand, there is a 
positive impact of credit risk on net interest income because, over time, banks adjust the credit 
spread on loans that are repriced. Looking at the overall impact on profits (Figure 12) it is 
evident that the rise in interest rates is the main cause of the fall in net profits as it drives both 
the squeeze in net margins and the rise in write-offs. It seems clear that credit and interest rate 
risk have to be assessed jointly and simultaneously for the whole portfolio. Were the bank focus 
only on the impact of credit risk on write-offs (Figure 10) without taking net interest income 
into account, it would overestimate the overall negative impact of the scenario on net profits by 
around 25%. The effects are not symmetric over time. In the first year, focusing only on write-
offs would lead to underestimate the negative impact on net profits by over 50% as the decrease 
in net interest income (red line in Figure 11) is not taken into account. However, by the third 
year, the bank has repriced a large proportion of its assets leading to an increase in net interest 
income. Therefore, a bank focusing solely on write-offs would ignore this positive effect and 
overestimate the negative impact on net profits by nearly 100% in the third year. Conversely, 
were the bank to assess the impact of higher interest rates on its book by purely undertaking a 
sensitivity analysis based on its repricing mismatch (shaded area in Figure 11), it would 
underestimate the negative impact of the shock by around 30% over the three-year period.  
Starting from this study, Alessandri and Drehmann (2010) develop an integrated economic 
capital model that jointly accounts for credit and interest rate risk in the banking book, i.e. 
where all exposures are not market - to - market but held to maturity, and interest rate risk arises 
due to volatility in the bank’s net income. They explicitly examine repricing mismatches (and 
thus market and credit risks) that typically arise between a bank’s assets and liabilities.  
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Figure 13:  A view of economic capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: in millions. ECCR is the economic capital against credit risk; ECNI is the economic capital against 
changes in net interest income excluding the impact of defaults on coupon payments; ECRNI is the 
economic capital against changes in net interest income including the impact of defaults on coupon 
payments; ECNP is the economic capital against changes in net profits. MEC is the ratio of [(ECCR+ 
ECRNI)- ECNP] over (ECCR+ ECRNI). E(NP) are expected net profits. VaRNP is the VaR of net profits 
at confidence interval (1-y) where y is the confidence level stated in the table. M2 is the ratio of [(ECCR+ 
ECRNI) – (E(NP)-VaRNP)] over (ECCR+ ECRNI). 
Source: Alessandri P., Drehmann M. (2009) 
As shown in Figure 13, for a hypothetical, average UK bank with exposures to only the UK and 
US, the difference between simple and aggregated economic capital, derived over a one-year 
horizon, is often significant: simple economic capital is an upper bound. The difference depends 
on various bank features, such as the granularity of assets, the funding structure or bank pricing 
behavior.  
For credit and interest rate risk, they define unexpected losses and thus economic capital as the 
difference between VaR at the specified 99% confidence level and expected losses. Their 
measures of economic capital for just credit risk and just interest rate risk do not fully 
disentangle these risks as the credit risk measure incorporates the effects of higher interest rates 
on default probabilities and the latter the effect of higher credit risk on income. The key point 
is that the framework represents a plausible description of how current capital models for the 
banking book capture these risks. The authors examine the ratio of unified economic capital to 
the sum of the component measures at three VaR quantiles. For the 95% percentile of portfolio 
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losses, unified capital measure is near zero, and thus the ratio is nearly zero as well. For the 
99% percentile, the ratio is quite small at 0.03, but the ratio rises quickly to just over 50% for 
the 99.9% percentile. This result still suggests that the compartmentalized approach is more 
conservative than the unified approach.  
The authors examine certain modifications of their assumptions, such as infinitely fine-grained 
portfolios to increase the correlation of portfolio credit risk with the macroeconomic factors, 
banking funding scenarios from all short- term debt that is frequently repriced to all long-term 
debt that is repriced only on a yearly basis, and find some interesting difference with the base 
case scenario. However, the lower integrated capital charge holds. On balance, these authors 
conclude that the bank’s capital is mis-measured if risk interdependencies are ignored. In 
particular, the addition of economic capital for interest rate and credit risk derived separately 
provides an upper bound relative to the integrated capital level. Two key factors determine this 
outcome. First, the credit risk in this bank is largely idiosyncratic and thus less dependent on 
the macroeconomic environment; and second, bank assets that are frequently repriced lead to a 
reduction in bank risk. Given that these conditions may be viewed as special cases, the authors 
recommend that “as a consequence, risk managers and regulators should work on the 
presumption that interactions between risk types may be such that the overall level of capital is 
higher than the sum of capital derived from risks independently.” 48 
  
                                                 
48Alessandri P., Drehmann M., An economic capital model integrating credit and interest rate risk in 
the banking book, ECB Working Paper no. 1041, April 2009 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In my thesis, I primarily explicated what the capital requirements are, taking into account the 
changes given by the Basel Accords. Banks, and financial institutions in general, should 
correctly identify and measure risks, in order to determine the economic capital in a coherent 
way.  
The main three risks banks face are credit risk, market risk, and operational risk. 
I discussed on risk measures and, then, on different approaches to calculate and aggregate risks, 
making a distinction between top-down and bottom-up methods. 
As regard to risk measures, in literature they are usually defined as random variable, i.e. 
portfolio losses or returns. I focused on VaR as a standard measure used in financial risk 
management, due to its conceptual simplicity, computational facility and ready applicability. 
However, VaR has some problems: it measures only quantiles of losses and does not regard 
any loss beyond the VaR level. VaR is criticized for not being a coherent risk measure because 
it may violate the sub-additivity criterion, in contrast with the idea that diversification could 
reduce risk. 
As regard to the aggregation of risks, I examined different approaches, dividing them into two 
macro-groups: top–down Vs bottom–up methods.  
Within Top-down approaches, the calculation of economic capital is first computed for 
individual risk types, and then aggregated to obtain the total economic capital for the bank. 
These approaches assume that market and credit risk are separable and look at the institution as 
a whole. The approaches used are simple summation, Var-Covar and Copulas. The simple 
summation approach seems to be too much conservative, because it does not consider the inter-
risk correlation and does not matters potential diversification benefits. Thus, it is often 
considered as an upper bound to the true economic capital, tending to overestimate true risk. 
As regard to Var-Cover method, it is the simplest approach that consider correlations between 
risks, but it assumes that all risks are jointly normally distributes, and this is a restrictive 
assumption. In many examples from the literature, VaR ratios based on Var-Covar approaches 
seem to be the smallest, while those based on simple summation approaches the largest. As 
regard to Copula approach, it allows a decomposition of a joint distribution into its marginal 
ones and its copulas. Combining marginal distributions into a joint one, once defined a specific 
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copula, the approach allows for a separate modeling of the marginal distributions and of the 
dependence structure. Copula functions are much more flexible than simple summation 
approach and Var-Cover approach, because they use the entire credit, market and operational 
risk distributions. A mixture of t- Copula and Gumbel Copula seems to be the best choice to 
have a coherent VaR ratio. 
As mentioned above, top - down approaches assume that risks are separable. However, it is 
usually not possible to divide the overall portfolio of a bank into sub-portfolios purely 
consisting of market, credit and operational risk, i.e. a sub-portfolio of risk factors. It is 
therefore incorrect to think of the banking book as a sub-portfolio of the overall bank portfolio 
for which only credit risk is relevant, and, at the same time, it is incorrect to view the trading 
boos as another sub-portfolio related solely on market risk. In fact, I discussed on how interest 
rate risk, for example, could affect both credit and market risk. 
Paper using the top-down approach assume the splitting up of the bank portfolio into sub-
portfolios, according to different types of risks, without considering that there could be 
compounding effects between the banking and trading book, between credit, market and 
operational risk. 
Using Bottom - up approaches, it is possible to model and measure simultaneously different 
risk types and there is no need for a later aggregation. 
Comparing results obtained using top-down and bottom-up approaches, many authors find out 
that separate analysis could underestimate risk, and does not capture interactions between 
market and credit risk, such as interest rate risk and exchange rate risk. 
Concluding, we can say that bank’s capital is mis-measured if risk interdependencies are 
ignored, and that an aggregated measure is necessary. 
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